The New York Times Urges Government Aggression Against Producers and Consumers of Automobiles

In its lead editorial, titled “Sticker Shock,” The New York Times of Sunday, June 5, 2011, has the audacity to declare that “…Detroit and other manufacturers make big changes only when regulators force them to.”

The Times apparently forgets that the big changes constituted first by the introduction of the automobile, way back in 1894, and then by the countless improvements in the automobile since that time, such as the self-starter, automatic transmission, power brakes, and power steering, were made by "Detroit" without the presence of government regulators, indeed, in large part precisely because of the absence of government regulators. And that the same point applies to virtually every other “big change,” in very line of business that has taken place since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.

Clearly, the free market, the market insofar as it is free of government regulators, has made not merely big, but absolutely enormous changes, the enormous changes that constitute the economic progress of the last 260 years or more!

The “big changes” that the Times complains of not being made unless forced by regulators are changes that do not constitute economic progress but impoverishment. The specific change referred to in its editorial is compelling the automobile industry to produce cars so small and light that they will be able to achieve 62 miles per gallon. The obvious fact is that consumers do not want such pieces of junk and because they don’t, the automobile industry does not waste time trying to produce them. The only thing that can bring about such a “big change” is the government’s use of physical force in an act of naked aggression against the consuming public and the automobile producers who profit by serving the consumers.

Wages and the Irrelevance of Worker Need and Employer Greed

The Marxian doctrine of the alleged arbitrary power of employers over wages appears plausible because there are two obvious facts that it relies on, facts which do not actually support it, but which appear to support it. These facts can be described as “worker need” and “employer greed.” The average worker must work in order to live, and he must find work fairly quickly, because his savings cannot sustain him for long. And if necessary—if he had no alternative—he would be willing to work for as little as minimum physical subsistence. At the same time, self-interest makes employers, like any other buyers, prefer to pay less rather than more—to pay lower wages rather than higher wages.

People put these two facts together and conclude that if employers were free, wages would be driven down by the force of the employers’ self-interest—as though by a giant plunger pushing down in an empty cylinder—and that no resistance to the fall in wages would be encountered until the point of minimum subsistence was reached. At that point, it is held, workers would refuse to work because starvation without the strain of labor would be preferable to starvation with the strain of labor.

What must be realized is that while it is true that workers would be willing to work for minimum subsistence if necessary, and that self-interest makes employers prefer to pay less rather than more, both of these facts are irrelevant to the wages the workers actually have to accept in the labor market.

Let us start with “worker need.” To understand why a worker’s willingness to work for subsistence if necessary is irrelevant to the wages he actually has to work for, consider the analogous case of the owner of a late-model car who decides to accept a job offer, and to live, in the heart of New York City. If this car owner cannot afford several hundred dollars a month to pay the cost of keeping his car in a garage, and if he cannot devote several prime working hours every week to driving around, hunting for places to park his car on the street, he will be willing, if he can find no better offer, to give his car away for free—indeed, to pay someone to come and take it off his hands. Yet the fact that he is willing to do this is absolutely irrelevant to the price he actually must accept for his car. That price is determined on the basis of the utility and scarcity of used cars—by the demand for and supply of such cars. Indeed, so long as the number of used cars offered for sale remained the same, and the demand for used cars remained the same, it would not matter even if every seller of such a car were willing to give his car away for free, or willing even to pay to have it taken off his hands. None of them would have to accept a zero or negative price or any price that is significantly different from the price he presently can receive.

This point is illustrated in terms of the simple supply and demand diagram presented in Figure 14–1. On the vertical axis, I depict the price of used cars, designated by P. On the horizontal axis, I depict the quantity of used cars, designated by Q, that sellers are prepared to sell and the buyers to buy at any given price. The willingness of sellers to sell some definite, given quantity of used cars at any price from zero on up (or, indeed, from less than zero by the cost of having the cars taken off their hands) is depicted by a vertical line drawn through that quantity. That vertical line, labeled SS, denotes the fact that sellers are willing to sell the specific quantity A of used cars at any price from something less than zero on up to as much as they can get for their cars. The fact that they are willing to sell for zero or a negative price has nothing whatever to do with the actual price they receive, which in this case is the very positive price P1. The actual price they receive in this case is determined by the limitation of the supply of used cars, together with the demand for used cars.



In Figure 14–1, it is determined at point E, which represents the intersection of the vertical supply line with the demand curve. The price that corresponds to that juncture of supply and demand is P1. The fact that the sellers are all willing if necessary to accept a price less than P1 is, as I say, simply irrelevant to the price they actually must accept. The price the sellers receive in a case of this kind is not determined by the terms on which they are willing to sell. Rather, it is determined by the competition of the buyers for the limited supply offered for sale. (This, of course, is the kind of case Böhm-Bawerk had in mind when he declared that “price is actually limited and determined by the valuations on the part of the buyers exclusively.”1)

Essentially the same diagram, Figure 14–2, depicts the case of labor. Instead of showing price on the vertical axis, I show wages, designated by W. Instead of the supply line being vertical to the point of the sellers being willing to pay to have their good taken off their hands, I assume that no supply whatever is offered below the point of “minimum subsistence,” M. This is depicted by a horizontal line drawn from M and parallel to the horizontal axis. Thus, the supply curve in this case has a horizontal portion at “minimum subsistence” before becoming vertical. These are the only differences between Figures 14–1 and 14–2.

Figure 14–2 makes clear that the fact that the workers are willing to work for as little as minimum subsistence is no more relevant to the wages they actually have to accept than was the fact in the previous example that the sellers of used cars were willing to give them away for free or pay to have them taken off their hands. For even though the workers are willing to work for as little as minimum subsistence, the wage they actually obtain in the conditions of the market is the incomparably higher wage W1, which is shown by the intersection—once again at point E—of the demand for labor with the limited supply of labor denoted by point A on the horizontal axis. Exactly like the value of used cars, or anything else that exists in a given, limited supply, the value of labor is determined on a foundation of its utility and scarcity, by demand and supply—more specifically, by the competition of buyers for the limited supply—not by any form of cost of production, least of all by any “cost of production of labor,” i.e., “minimum subsistence.”

It also quickly becomes clear that “employer greed” is fully as irrelevant to the determination of wage rates as “worker need.” This becomes apparent as soon as one thinks in terms of the conditions of an auction. The competition of two or more bidders at an auction brings out the essential nature of the market for labor and clearly demonstrates the actual nature of the self-interest of buyers. Thus, assume that there are two people at an art auction, both of whom want the same painting. One of these people, let us call him Mr. Smith, is willing and able to bid as high as $2,000 for the painting. The other, let us call him Mr. Jones, is willing and able to go no higher than $1,000.

Of course, Mr. Smith does not want to spend $2,000 for the painting. This figure is merely the limit of how high he will go if he has to. He would much prefer to obtain the painting for only $200, or better still, for only $20, or, best of all, for nothing at all. What we must understand here is precisely how low a bid Mr. Smith’s rational self-interest allows him to persist in. Would it, for example, actually be to Mr. Smith’s self-interest to persist in a bid of only $20, or $200?

It should be obvious that the answer to this question is decidedly no! This is because if Mr. Smith persists in such a low bid, the effect will be that he loses the painting to Mr. Jones, who is willing and able to bid more than $20 and more than $200. In fact, in the conditions of this case, Mr. Smith must lose the painting to the higher bidding of Mr. Jones, if he persists in bidding any sum under $1,000! If Mr. Smith is to obtain the painting, the conditions of the case require him to bid more than $1,000, because that is the sum required to exceed the maximum potential bid of Mr. Jones.

This case contains the fundamental principle that names the actual self-interest of buyers. That principle is that a buyer rationally desires to pay not the lowest price he can imagine or would like to pay, but the lowest price that is simultaneously too high for any other potential buyer of the good, who would otherwise obtain the good in his place.

This identical principle, of course, applies to the determination of wage rates.

The only difference between the labor market and the auction of a painting is the number of units involved. Instead of one painting with two potential buyers for it, there are many millions of workers who must sell their services, together with potential employers of all those workers and of untold millions more workers. This is because just as in the example of the art auction, the essential fact that is present in the labor market is that the potential quantity demanded exceeds the supply available. The potential quantity of labor demanded always far exceeds the quantity of labor that the workers are able, let alone willing, to perform.

For labor, it should be understood, is scarce. It is the most fundamentally useful and scarce thing in the economic system: virtually everything else that is useful is its product and is limited in supply only by virtue of our lack of ability or willingness to expend more labor to produce a larger quantity of it. (This, of course, includes raw materials, which can always be produced in larger quantity by devoting more labor to the more intensive exploitation of land and mineral deposits that are already used in production, or by devoting labor to the exploitation of land and mineral deposits not presently exploited.)

At the same time, for all practical purposes there is no limit to our need and desire for goods or, therefore, for the performance of the labor required to produce them. In having, for example, a need and desire to be able to spend incomes five or ten times the incomes we presently spend, we have an implicit need and desire for the performance of five or ten times the labor we presently perform, for that is what would be required in the present state of technology and the productivity of labor to supply us with such increases in the supply of goods. Moreover, almost all of us would welcome the full-time personal services of at least several other people. Thus, on both grounds labor is scarce.

For the maximum amount of labor available to satisfy the needs and desires of the average member of the economic system can never exceed the labor of just one person. One person is the number that always results when we divide one and the same number of people in their capacity as consumers by that number of people in their capacity as potential producers. Indeed, in actual practice, the amount of labor available per person falls far short of the labor of one person, because of the existence of large numbers of people, notably young children and the elderly, who are incapable of performing labor and must live as dependents on the labor of others.

The consequence of the scarcity of labor is that wage rates in a free market can fall no lower than corresponds to the point of full employment. At that point the scarcity of labor is felt, and any further fall in wage rates would be against the self-interests of employers, because then a labor shortage would ensue. Thus, if somehow wage rates did fall below the point corresponding to full employment, it would be to the self-interest of employers to bid them back up again.

These facts can be shown in the same supply and demand diagram I used to show the irrelevance to wage determination of workers being willing to work for subsistence. Thus, Figure 14–3 shows that if wage rates were below their market equilibrium of W1, which takes place at the point of full employment, denoted by E—if, for example, they were at the lower level of W2—a labor shortage would exist. The quantity of labor demanded at the wage rate of W2 is B. But the quantity of labor available—whose employment constitutes full employment—is the smaller amount A. Thus, at the lower wage, the quantity of labor demanded exceeds the supply available by the horizontal distance AB.



The shortage exists because the lower wage of W2 enables employers to afford labor who would not have been able to afford it at the wage of W1, or it enables employers who would have been able to afford some labor at the wage of W1 to now afford a larger quantity of labor. To whatever extent such employers employ labor that they otherwise could not have employed, that much less labor remains to be employed by other employers, who are willing and able to pay the higher wage of W1.

At the artificially low wage of W2, the entire quantity AB of labor is employed by employers who otherwise could not have afforded to employ that labor. The effect of this is to leave an equivalently reduced quantity of labor available for those employers who could have afforded the market wage of W1. The labor available to those employers is reduced by AC, which is precisely equal to AB. This is the inescapable result of the existence of a given quantity of labor and some of it being taken off the market by some employers at the expense of other employers. What the one set gains, the other must lose. Thus, because the wage is W2 rather than W1, the employers who could have afforded the market wage of W1 and obtained the full quantity of labor A are now able to employ only the smaller quantity of labor C, because labor has been taken off the market by employers who depend on the artificially low wage of W2.

The employers who could have afforded the market wage of W1 are in identically the same position as the bidder at the art auction who is about to see the painting he wants go to another bidder not able or willing to pay as much. The way to think of the situation is that there are two groups of bidders for quantity AB of labor: those willing and able to pay the market wage of W1, or an even higher wage—one as high as W3—and those willing and able to pay only a wage that is below W1—a wage that must be as low as W2. In Figure 14–3, the position of these two groups is indicated by two zones on the demand curve: an upper zone HE and a lower zone EL. The wage of W1 is required for the employers in the upper zone to be able to outbid the employers in the lower zone.

The question is: Is it to the rational self-interest of the employers willing and able to pay a wage of W1, or higher, to lose the labor they want to other employers not able or willing to pay a wage as high as W1? The obvious answer is no. And the consequence is that if, somehow, the wage were to fall below W1, the self-interest of employers who are willing and able to pay W1 or more, and who stood to lose some of their workers if they did not do so, would lead them to bid wage rates back up to W1. The rational self-interest of employers, like the rational self-interest of any other buyers, does not lead them to pay the lowest wage (price) they can imagine, but the lowest wage that is simultaneously too high for other potential employers of the same labor who are not able or willing to pay as much and who would otherwise be enabled to employ that labor in their place.

The principle that it is against the self-interest of employers to allow wage rates to fall to the point of creating a labor shortage is illustrated by the conditions which prevail when the government imposes such a shortage by virtue of a policy of price and wage controls. In such conditions, employers actually conspire with the wage earners to evade the controls and to raise wage rates. They do so by such means as awarding artificial promotions, which allow them to pay higher wages within the framework of the wage controls.

The payment of higher wages in the face of a labor shortage is to the self-interest of employers because it is the necessary means of gaining and keeping the labor they want to employ. In overbidding the competition of other potential employers for labor, it attracts workers to come to work for them and it removes any incentive for their present workers to leave their employ. This is because it eliminates the artificial demand for labor by the employers who depend on a below-market wage in order to be able to afford labor. It is, as I say, identically the same in principle as the bidder who wants the painting at an auction raising his bid to prevent the loss of the painting to another bidder not able or willing to pay as much. The higher bid is to his self-interest because it knocks out the competition. In the conditions of a labor shortage, which necessarily materializes if wage rates go below the point corresponding to full employment, the payment of higher wages provides exactly the same benefit to employers.


On the basis of the preceding discussion, it should be clear that average money wage rates are determined neither by worker need nor by employer greed, but, basically, by the quantity of money in the economic system and thus the aggregate monetary demand for labor, on the one side, and by the number of workers willing and able to work, on the other—that is, by the ratio of the demand for labor to the supply of labor. It should also be clear that in a free labor market, money wage rates can fall no lower than corresponds to the point of full employment.

Two points should be realized in connection with the principle that it is against the self-interest of employers to allow wage rates to fall below the point that corresponds to full employment. First, the operation of the principle does not require that full employment be established throughout the economic system before wage rates cease to fall. On the contrary, the principle applies to each occupation and, still more narrowly, to each occupation within each geographical area. For example, the wage rates of carpenters in Des Moines can fall no further than corresponds to the point of full employment of carpenters in Des Moines. Any further fall would create a shortage of such carpenters and thus would be prevented or quickly reversed, even though there might still be major unemployment in other occupations or in other geographical areas.

Second, the operation of the principle need not be feared as possibly serving to bring about the establishment of subsistence wages through the back door, so to speak. By this, I mean that so long as unemployment exists, there is room for wage rates to fall without the creation of a labor shortage. And in a free market, wage rates would in fact fall in such circumstances. This is because in such circumstances, the self-interest of the employers, and also of the unemployed, would operate to drive them down. It should not be thought, however, that the fall in wage rates in these circumstances meant that the conditions of supply and demand were capable of accomplishing the human misery that Marxism attributes to the alleged arbitrary power of businessmen and capitalists.

A drop in wage rates to the full employment point does not imply any drop in the average worker’s standard of living. That is, it does not imply any reduction in the goods and services he can actually buy—any reduction in his so called real wages—because the elimination of unemployment that the fall in wage rates brings about means more production and a fall in costs of production, both of which mean lower prices. Indeed, it is likely that real wages actually rise with the elimination of unemployment, even in the short run, because not only do prices fall as much as, or even more than, wages, but also the burden of supporting the unemployed is eliminated, with the result that disposable, take-home pay drops less than gross wages and less than prices. When these facts are kept in mind, it is clear that insofar as market conditions require a fall in wage rates, they are, if anything, at the same time operating to raise the average worker’s standard of living further above subsistence, not drive it down toward subsistence.

Copyright © 2011 by George Reisman. This article is adapted from a section of Chapter 14, specifically pp. 613-18, of the author’s Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996). George Reisman, Ph.D., is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics and Senior Fellow at the Goldwater Institute. His web site is http://www.capitalism.net/. His blog is georgereismansblog.blogspot.com. Send him mail. (A PDF replica of the complete book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics can be downloaded to the reader's hard drive simply by clicking on the book’s title, immediately preceding, and then saving the file when it appears on the screen.)

1. See Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, 3 vols., trans. George D. Huncke and Hans F. Sennholz (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1959), 2:245. See also above, pp. 162–63.

How to Eliminate Social Security and Medicare*

Expenditures under the Social Security and Medicare programs account for approximately one-third of total federal government spending.1 It is obvious that any major reduction in government spending requires major reductions in spending for these programs. Unfortunately, Social Security and Medicare are generally regarded as sacred and thus virtually untouchable, with the result that few if any proposals have been made that would greatly reduce the spending they entail.2

At present, the age at which full—“normal”—Social Security benefits can be obtained, given the individual’s lifetime earnings and contributions to the system up to that time, is 66. This represents an increase of 1 year from the age in force from the system’s inception until 2003, at which time it was increased by 2 months, reaching 66 after a series of 5 more 2-month increases in the years 2004-2008. Commencing in 2021, the full-benefit retirement age is scheduled to begin increasing by a second series of 2-month additions, until a full-benefit retirement age of 67 is reached in 2027.

From the beginning of the system, and scheduled to continue indefinitely, it has been possible to choose to receive Social Security benefits starting at age 62, though at a reduced rate. This rate is currently 75 percent of the full-benefit amount, down from 80 percent when the full-benefit retirement age was 65, and is scheduled to fall to 70 percent when the full-benefit retirement age rises to 67. By continuing to work and postponing the receipt of benefits until age 70, it has been possible to obtain premium benefits that are currently, i.e., for retirees in 2011, 32 percent higher than the “full” benefit amount. This premium is scheduled to fall to 24 percent when the full-benefit retirement age rises to 67.

The age for enrollment in Medicare is still 65, and, under existing law, is not scheduled to increase. Indeed, enrollment at any later age is frequently penalized.

The Social Security system, together with Medicare, could be eliminated by means of the following steps, each one of which would result in substantial cost savings. First, following a grace period of perhaps two or three years, to provide sufficient warning and time to adjust, there should be a phased increase to 70 in the age at which individuals are eligible to receive full Social Security benefits and Medicare. At the same time, the early benefit retirement age for Social Security should be increased from 62 to 66.

The increases in age could take place in 6-month increments over a period of 8 years, with the exception of an initial increment of 1½ years in the case of Medicare. Thus, assuming that the reform I’m proposing were implemented prior to 2021, with the Social Security retirement age still at 66, in the first year of its implementation the early Social Security retirement age would be raised to 62½, while the full-benefit retirement age, along with the Medicare retirement age, rose to 66½. In the second year, the respective retirement ages would be 63 and 67. And so it would continue, year after year, for a total increase of 4 years over an 8 year period.

In this period, apart from adjustments for increases in the consumer price index, retirement benefits would remain unchanged as the respective ages increased at which they could begin to be obtained. Thus, by the end of the process, individuals receiving early retirement benefits at age 66 would receive no greater benefits than individuals had previously obtained at age 62. In the same way, individuals at age 70would receive full benefits no greater than individuals had received at age 66, before the process of reform began.

Thus, when completed, after 8 years, the effect of just this phase of the reform would be a substantial reduction both in the number of people receiving Social Security and Medicare benefits and in the average per capita benefit received by those who remained in the Social Security program. Members of the age group 65-69 would no longer receive Medicare benefits. Members of the age-group 62-65 would no longer receive Social Security at all. Members of the age-group 66-69 enrolled in the program at that time, would receive benefits 25 percent less than their predecessors had received, before the start of the reform, because just as early retirement benefits starting at age 62 had been 25 percent less than the full benefits starting at age 66, so now early retirement benefits starting at age 66 would be 25 percent less than full benefits starting at age 70. Indeed, the reduction in the benefits of the 66-69 age-group would be further increased to the extent that they would no longer contain any premiums for retirement after 66. The elimination of premium benefits would ultimately work to reduce the aggregate benefits of all later age-groups as well, insofar as they too would eventually no longer reflect the incorporation of premium benefits to anyone.

As of December 2009, of the approximately 33.5 million people receiving Social Security retirement benefits, approximately 4.4 million, or roughly 13 percent, were in the age-group 62-65. This group received retirement benefits of $54.7 billion, which represents about 11.7 percent of the aggregate Social Security retirement benefits of $468.2 paid in 2009.3 It is not unreasonable to assume that the closing of Social Security to new enrollees in the 62-65 age-group would achieve comparable percentage reductions in the number of people receiving Social Security retirement benefits and in the overall cost of the program. To this must be added the effect of the 25 percent reduction in the benefits of the 66-69 age-group plus the effect of the elimination of premiums for late retirement.

Based on the Social Security benefits paid to the members of the 62-65 and 66-69 age-groups in 2009 relative to total Social Security retirement benefits in that year, the resulting overall reduction in the cost of such benefits can be estimated at approximately 18 percent. The benefits paid to the members of the 66-69 age-group were $116.9 billion, representing 25 percent of the total. A 25 percent reduction in these benefits represents a reduction of 6.25 percent in overall benefits. Thus, the total reduction in benefits is the sum of 11.7 percent, the share of Social Security retirement income previously received by the members of the 62-65 age-group, plus 6.25 percent, i.e., approximately 18 percent in all. This percentage is the measure of the reduction in the yearly cost of Social Security that can be expected at the end of 8 years.

Based on data supplied by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (Medpac), the cost savings in Medicare that would result from a rise in the eligible age from 65 to 70 can be estimated at perhaps as much as 15 percent of Medicare’s spending.4

The second step in the elimination of Social Security would be the elimination of the category of early retirement. This could be accomplished by the early retirement age continuing to increase by a further set of 8 increments of 6-months each, which would bring it to the point of coinciding with the by-then established full-benefit retirement age of 70. Based on the data from 2009, this would result in cutting the cost of Social Security by a further 18.75 percent, raising the total cost saving, at the end of 16 years, to almost 37 percent per year.

Compensation for the Loss of Social Security and Medicare Benefits

As compensation for their loss of Social Security and Medicare benefits, individuals in the 66-69 age-group who remained at work, which many of them would now no doubt have to do, would be made exempt from federal income taxes on an amount of income equal at least to the maximum income then subject to the payment of Social Security taxes. (This amount is currently $106,800.) These individuals would also be exempted from the payment of Social Security taxes, including employer contributions on the part of those who were self-employed.

The exemptions would be adjusted for increases in the consumer price index and be automatically extended to older ages as the Social Security/Medicare retirement age advanced beyond 70. Indeed, right from the very beginning of the reform, the exemptions would apply to all individuals 66 or older eligible for Social Security retirement benefits who abstained from taking them in any given year. For example, even in the very first year of the reform, someone 75 or 80, who did not accept those benefits in that year, would have these tax exemptions in that year.

It should be realized that these federal income tax exemptions would apply to incomes that for the most part would not otherwise have existed, with the result that the government would not incur any significant loss of revenue by offering them. Indeed, the result of millions of people in their sixties remaining in employment and off Social Security and Medicare would not only be a major reduction in government spending for Social Security and Medicare, but also a substantial rise in government tax revenues as well.

The rise in tax revenues would come about because people in the 62–69 age bracket, now gainfully employed instead of on Social Security and Medicare, would pay more in the form of sales, excise, and property taxes, as the result of their having and spending higher incomes than they would have received from Social Security. And they would pay more in the form of state and local income taxes as well. For example, instead of someone receiving $10,000 or $20,000 a year in Social Security income, he would earn $20,000 or $30,000 or more in employment income. The federal government would save the $10,000 or $20,000 Social Security expenditure (plus more or less considerable Medicare expenditure), and, in addition, state and local governments would collect significant additional tax revenues out of the expenditure of the newly earned employment incomes.

It must be pointed out here that the phaseout of the Social Security and Medicare programs, or the undertaking of any other measure that would be accompanied by an increase in the number of people seeking employment, calls for an intensification of efforts to abolish or restrict as far as possible prounion and minimum-wage legislation. This is necessary in order to make it possible for the larger number of job seekers to find employment. Union pay scales and a government-imposed minimum wage operate to prevent this by arbitrarily and forcibly holding wage rates above free-market rates, thereby holding the quantity of labor demanded below the supply available.

Raising the Social Security/Medicare Retirement Age Beyond 70 and Closing the Programs to New Entrants

The next step in the elimination of Social Security/Medicare would be raising their retirement age beyond 70. This could be accomplished by further incremental annual increases, this time of one calendar quarter with the passage of each year. Thus, by the end of an additional 20 years, the Social Security/Medicare retirement age would be 75. At that point, based on the same data as cited previously, the annual savings in the cost of Social Security retirement benefits would be slightly more than 59 percent, while the annual savings in Medicare expenditures would be almost 31 percent.

Raising their retirement age 1 year more, over an additional 4 year period, would bring the total lapse of time from the initial implementation of the phaseout reform to 40 years. Under this arrangement, everyone age 36 and above at the start of the phaseout reform would be able to look forward to enrolling in Social Security and Medicare no later than at age 76, if that is what he wanted. At the same time, if he wished the equivalent of being able to retire at age 70 on a Social Security income, all that would be required of him would be to make provision for a maximum of the 6 years between age 70 and age 76 at a level equal to what he would previously have received under the Social Security Program.

Forty years is a sufficient period of time to enable everyone age 35 or below at the time of the initial implementation to make adequate provision for his own retirement at age 70, or even at age 65 if that is what he wanted. At this point then, the Social Security and Medicare programs would be closed to new enrollees.

Thereafter, with the passage of each year, the cost of the programs would steadily diminish. Based once more on the same data as referenced previously, after an additional 9 years, by which time the minimum age of those still receiving Social Security and Medicare would be 85, the annual cost of the programs could be expected to be reduced by 88 percent and 66 percent respectively. With the passage of 10 years more, by which time the minimum age of those still receiving benefits was 95, the annual cost of Social Security would be reduced by 99 percent and that of Medicare by a further 16 to 17 percent, for a cumulative reduction of 82 to 83 percent.

The failure of Medicare expenditures to diminish further is the result of the fact that approximately 17 percent of Medicare expenditures are made on behalf of people under the age of 65—14.9 percent on behalf of those who are disabled and 2.1 percent on behalf of those with end-stage renal disease, who require dialysis.5

Just as payments on behalf of the elderly do not account for all Medicare expenditures, so too expenditures made under the heading of Social Security are not exclusively for the benefit of retired workers. While expenditures providing retirement income were $468.2 billion in 2009, there were in addition expenditures of approximately $89 billion for Survivor’s Insurance and $118.3 billion for Disability Insurance. Thus, the overall total expenditure under the head “Social Security” came to $675.5 billion.6

The complete elimination of Social Security and Medicare would, of course, require the elimination of these aspects of the programs as well. Possible first steps in this direction would be the establishment of means tests for the receipt of such aid along with the return of such programs to the states and localities. These steps could begin early in the phaseout.

The Effect of Eliminating Social Security/Medicare on Real Wages and the General Standard of Living

As previously indicated, from the very beginning of the process of eliminating Social Security/Medicare, everyone 66 and above would have the opportunity of enjoying a life largely free of federal income taxation on earnings derived from employment. Everyone 66 and above would have an employment-income exemption in excess of $100,000 per year, in terms of present purchasing power, for the remainder of his life. The most that anyone would have to do to secure this opportunity in a given year would be to abstain from taking Social Security income in that year, if he were eligible to receive it. Retirement years marked by this freedom from income taxation might thus become truly “Golden Years.”

In addition, the progressive elimination of the Social Security/Medicare system would operate to promote saving and capital accumulation. The saving of individuals would steadily replace taxes as the source of provision for old age. The increased capital accumulation that this made possible would, of course, increase the demand for labor and the productivity of labor, which means that it would increase wage rates and the supply of goods, which latter would operate to reduce prices. Thus, real wages and the general standard of living would rise. The rise would be a continuing one insofar as the rate of capital accumulation was permanently increased as the result of greater saving and a correspondingly greater concentration on the production of capital goods relative to consumers’ goods.

*****

At the same time, however, over the course of the many years that would be required for the burden of Social Security/Medicare to reach the vanishing point, all those people thirty-five and below at the time of the start of the phaseout program, and many of their children, would painfully learn the meaning of having to pay off a national debt. For the financial obligations incurred under Social Security and Medicare are in fact an enormous national debt. They are an enormous national debt incurred to elderly and infirm people incapable of caring for themselves. People incapable in large measure simply because they had been promised that the government would care for them and thus that it was not necessary for them to save.

Two major lessons to be learned from the financial disaster constituted by Social Security/Medicare are that the government should be prohibited from incurring any significant national debt and that a governmental promise of pensions or provision of future medical care is a category of national debt. All levels of government should be constitutionally prohibited from incurring significant amounts of debt beyond a very short term, including, above all, pension obligations of any kind.

Hopefully, there is a special place in Hell reserved for all the political con-men and intellectual shysters of the last generations who endlessly dismissed the significance of national debts with such glib phrases as “we owe it to ourselves” and asserted that national debts need never be paid. These, of course, were the same con-men and shysters who again and again ignorantly denounced saving as cash hoarding and the cause of depressions and mass unemployment.

And in the case of all the government officials who over a period of decades and decades knowingly used the proceeds of Social Security taxes to finance current government spending, these con-men and shysters descended to the status of major criminals, guilty of the crime of embezzlement on a scale unprecedented in all of human history. They diverted literally trillions of dollars of what people were led to believe were their savings, set aside for their future benefit, into current government spending. The spending was for projects desired by these officials and designed to keep them in office by fostering the illusion that the officials had performed the miracle of providing seemingly valuable current benefits at no corresponding cost. Of course, the reason for the apparent lack of cost was that the costs were covered by the proceeds of embezzlement.

Social Security and Medicare have caused a massive diversion of savings into government consumption not only by diverting the proceeds of Social Security and Medicare taxes into current government spending, but by first, and more fundamentally, undermining one of the most important motivations for private saving and investment, namely, the need to provide for one’s old age. The effect of Social Security and Medicare has been to remove the apparent need for much of that saving. Not surprisingly, in the conviction that the government was now providing for people’s old age, the rate of saving in the United States has declined precipitously over the years, falling all the way to zero in some years.

The government, of course, made no such actual provision. For the accumulation of actual physical capital assets based on decades of private saving and investment, that in a free economy would have been the source of future financial security, it substituted its promise to levy taxes on future generations, while it consumed the funds that should have gone into saving and investment and a resulting accumulation of capital assets.

It must be realized that this lost private saving and investment and its corresponding accumulation of capital assets was essential just to maintain the stock of capital assets, let alone increase it. This is because in old age and retirement, people consume the wealth they have accumulated to provide for that period of their lives. If the generations following them are not engaged in making their own, fresh provision for old age and retirement, the consumption of a current generation of the elderly serves to deplete the overall stock of capital assets in the economic system. From its inception in 1935 to the present day, the Social Security system, reinforced by Medicare since 1965, has served both to undercut people’s motivation to provide for old age and retirement by means of saving and also, as the taxes to finance these programs have increased, their sheer ability to do so. Thus more and more of the savings and capital assets accumulated in the past have been lost.

One can see the effects of this decumulation in the withering of the industrial base of the United States and in the accompanying dramatic decline of formerly major centers of production, such as Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis. The wealth that was once present there has disappeared, sucked up into the voracious consumption of the government, under the leadership of ignorant, dishonest, and vicious politicians and officials.

Of course, the customary explanation of the decline in America’s industrial base is the competition of foreign producers paying lower wages. However, the truth is that if American producers had had more capital, they would have been able to produce more efficiently and at lower costs, thereby more frequently offsetting the advantages foreign producers had by virtue of being able to pay lower wages. Indeed, for generations, American producers had been able to do this. Their superiority in terms of capital invested per worker enabled them to offset even enormous differences between American and foreign wage rates through the higher productivity of American workers resulting from greater capital investment.

True enough, foreign investment and the international movement of capital have become much easier since the second half of the last century than it was in the first half. But investing in foreign countries does not reduce the capital invested in the countries in which the investors reside. To the contrary, it increases that capital. This is because the investment greatly increases the productivity of labor and the total of what is produced in the foreign countries, and a major portion of that additional production is capital goods that are exported to the country of the investors. Just as investment in the western states of the United States by citizens of the country’s eastern states served to increase the wealth present in the eastern states, on the foundation of goods received from the western states, so too investment by American citizens as a whole in places like Japan and China serve to increase the capital goods in the United States as a whole, by virtue of the capital goods coming into it from Japan and China. These capital goods can be seen not only in masses of foreign-made components and parts used by American producers, but also in numerous factories, such as the automobile plants built by Japanese and Korean firms in the United States. The influx of foreign capital can also be seen in the fact that it is that foreign capital that largely finances the budget deficits of our spendthrift government and prevents those deficits from consuming still more of the previously accumulated capital of the United States.

Thus, the cause of America’s industrial decline is not investment outside the country. Nor, of course, is it exclusively the result of Social Security and Medicare and the decline in saving and investment that they in particular have caused.

There are numerous additional causes of America’ economic decline. However, all of them share with Social Security and Medicare the fact that they represent instances of government interference in the economic system that serve to undermine capital accumulation and the rise in the productivity of labor. First and foremost among them is the government’s limitless appetite for spending and the unending expansion of its powers and activities that growing spending feeds. The additional spending is financed to an important extent by arbitrary increases in the money supply, i.e., inflation, and the closely related policy of credit expansion and its consequent massive waste of capital. Along with inflation and credit expansion, there is the confiscatory taxation of income that otherwise would have been heavily saved and invested, most notably, profits, interest, dividends, and capital gains, as well as inheritance taxes, which are a tax on capital already accumulated. In addition, there is the granting of monopoly privileges to labor unions and all other government interference and regulation that arbitrarily serve to raise costs of production and reduce output per unit of input, insofar as the output being reduced is the production of capital goods.7

The Special Problems of Eliminating Medicare

The elimination of Medicare, especially after age 70, requires that steps be taken to make medical care for the elderly affordable outside of Medicare (and outside of most private medical insurance plans as well). This requires eliminating as far as possible all of the government intervention that over the generations has been responsible for increasing the cost of medical care. In my essay “The Real Right to Medical Care Versus Socialized Medicine,” I present a detailed explanation of the various ways in which government intervention has been responsible for the rise in the cost of privately provided medical care and a program of pro-free-market reform that would dramatically reduce the cost of such medical care and make it affordable for the most part to people without medical insurance.

Though written in 1994, in order to help prevent enactment of the so-called Clinton Plan, its findings are as applicable today as they were then, and should be considered as an essential part of my proposals for eliminating Social Security/Medicare. The only significant details that would need to be changed are the replacement of the absurdly and unnecessarily high costs of privately provided medical care in 1994, reflecting all of the government intervention in medical care up to that time, with the still far more absurdly and unnecessarily high costs of privately provided medical care today, which incorporate the effect of the massive inflation of the money supply that has taken place in the intervening years.

Reform in the Spirit of Classical Liberalism

An important feature of the program of reform that I have presented is that it need not be accepted in toto. Its advocacy of a rise in the Social Security/Medicare retirement age to 70, and even to 75, could be accepted by those who wished to retain these programs but limit them to an older population than is the case at present. The enactment of either of these limitations would be an important victory. One that would take nothing away from the goal of the ultimate total elimination of Social Security and Medicare and would serve as an important step on the way to the achievement of that goal.

This program will undoubtedly seem much too slow for some supporters of individual rights and freedom. Nevertheless, I believe that it is in fact the most rapid means of achieving its ultimate goal that does not entail a revolutionary overthrow of what have come to be established rights in the law, however wrong-headed the law has been in establishing those rights in the first place. Proceeding in this way is an essential aspect of Liberalism in its classical sense. Fundamentally, rights to entitlements of any kind, that must be paid for involuntarily by other people, are no more legitimate than the alleged property rights of slave owners in their slaves. Yet to avoid civil war, Liberalism would have urged a policy of compensated emancipation rather than one of violent emancipation. Today, in fundamentally similar circumstances, Liberalism must limit as far as possible the disturbance that would otherwise be caused by the elimination of illegitimate, perverted rights.

Individualism Versus Collectivism

At the most fundamental level, what this discussion of reform serves to bring out is the conflict between the philosophies of individualism and collectivism. Social Security and Medicare are monuments to collectivism. Both rest on the premise that the individual cannot make his own provision for old age by means of saving and that instead he must rely on that great collective, Organized Society, i.e., the Government, to make provision for him.

The individual, of course, is the party with by far the greatest interest, indeed, the only really powerful, life-or-death interest, in providing for his old age. The rest of the world can never experience the matter with the intensity with which he will one day experience it if he lives to old age, nor with the intensity that he would experience it relatively early in life if he were accustomed to think clearly about the future.

Many individuals, of course, do not think about the future, or not sufficiently about it. But many in this category, perhaps the great majority of them, would do so if they lived in conditions in which they were familiar with the suffering of others that resulted from bad choices and were not protected from themselves suffering the consequences of their own bad choices.

In any event, it cannot be that a solution for any presumed inadequacies of the individual lies in removing his responsibility for providing for his future and placing that responsibility instead in the hands of a mass of other individuals. For those other individuals must be presumed to be not only equally incompetent, but they also lack the motivation of self-preservation that each individual experiences in matters of his own life and well being. Indeed, the notion that the alleged incompetence of the individual is a basis for turning responsibility over to the collective reduces to the absurdity that those who are incompetent to run their own lives, in which everything is at stake for them, are thereby qualified to run the lives of others, in which virtually nothing is at stake for them.

The consequences of enacting this absurdity are not only economic destruction through the undermining of saving but also the potential for nothing less than a virtual geriatric holocaust. That will be the result when masses of elderly people, without means of their own and dependent instead on the support of masses of anonymous strangers, wake up to find that the strangers have grown tired of supporting them.

A foretaste of this outcome can be found in the “death panels” that many observers discerned in the healthcare legislation enacted in the last Congress. It can be found within the last few days in news stories about efforts to stop dialysis treatments for elderly patients. (See, for example, “When Ailments Pile Up, Asking Patients to Rethink Free Dialysis,” The New York Times, April 1, p. 1.)

With government control of medical care and what is considered proper medical protocol in the treatment of diseases, even those who have managed to provide for their own future are at risk.

Despite their endless posturing and pretense, politicians do not love the masses—of any age. What they love is their own power. They pretend to love the masses as a vehicle for gaining power. History shows again and again that once they gain it, the lives of millions become expendable.

The actual fact is that while the lives of the elderly are of inestimable value, when taken one at a time, to the individual elderly person concerned, they are of no actual value to politicians and government officials. Indeed, from the perspective of the self-interest of all-powerful officials, contemplating the land and the people of their country as their personal possessions, existing for no purpose other than their—the officials’—glorification, the existence of the elderly stands as an actual impediment. For the elderly consume substantial amounts of the resources of the collective that the officials control, and at the same time they produce little or nothing, and no longer have any prospect of ever doing so. If they ceased to exist, the officials would have resources available to put to other uses that they would certainly judge to be more important.

Today, of course, the elderly still have the vote, and that may protect them for a time. But all-powerful government is clearly the direction in which we are moving. We are placing ourselves more and more in the power of government officials who regard us the way a farmer regards his livestock. We will be able to live, in poverty and as slaves, so long as we are useful to them. But when we are too old to be useful to them, we will be left to die. As the Times’ article referenced above put it, we will then be spoken of in terms of such euphemisms as having “chosen `medical management without dialysis,’” i.e., “medical management” without treatment.

If we want to protect the value of individual human life, particularly in old age, when it is most vulnerable, we must reverse direction and start dismantling Social Security and Medicare, two potentially deadly collectivist institutions. We must restore to the individual the responsibility and the power to determine his own future through forethought and saving. The individual must have his own individual property with the freedom to use it for his own well-being, as he sees fit. Government officials must be barred from the process.

* Copyright © 2011 by George Reisman. This article is a revised and expanded treatment of the subject that appears on pp. 976-77 of the author’s Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996). George Reisman, Ph.D. is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics and a Senior Fellow at the Goldwater Institute. His website is www.capitalism.net.

1. In fiscal year 2012, expenditures for Social Security are projected to be $761 billion, while those for Medicare are projected to be $468 billion. Total federal government spending in 2012 is projected to be $3,699 billion. Source: Fiscal Year 2012, Budget of the U.S. Government Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), p. 174 (Table S-3).

2. An exception may be the budget proposal currently being developed by a number of Republican members of the House of Representatives, which reportedly seeks to reduce federal government spending by $4 trillion over a period of 10 years, in large part by replacing direct federal spending for Medicare by federal subsidies for the purchase of private medical insurance. (See The Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2011, p. 1.)

3. Source: Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2010, p. 228 (Table 5.A1.1).

4. See Medpac, June 2010 A Data Book, Healthcare Spending and the Medicare Program, p. 34 (Chart 2-2. Medicare enrollment and spending by age-group, 2006). This chart shows that almost 31 percent of Medicare’s spending is on account of the age-group 65-74. At the same time, Social Security Data show that the 65-69 subgroup accounts for 55 percent of the larger age-group. The larger proportion of people in the younger subgroup offsets to an important extent the higher per capita medical expenses of the older subgroup and suggests the possibility of the degree of cost reduction indicated.

5. See Medpac, ibid., p. 33 (Chart 2-1).

6. See Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2010, p. 1.

7. For elaboration of this last point, see “The Undermining of Capital Accumulation and Real Wages by Government Intervention,” pp. 636-39 of the author’s Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996).

WHERE PROFIT COMES FROM

Labor unions like to argue that the payment of higher wages is to the self-interest of employers because the wage earners will use their higher wages to make additional purchases from business firms, thereby increasing the sales revenues and profits of business firms. However, wrong and foolish it may be, this is an argument worth analyzing in some detail, because it can provide a gateway to a discussion of the actual sources of profit in the economic system.

The union argument, of course, ignores the fact that the business firms paying the higher wages and those earning the additional sales revenues and profits that are alleged to result are likely to be different firms. Indeed, insofar as any one, individual firm is considered, this will certainly be the case, if for no other reason than that very little, if any, of the additional wages paid by that one firm are likely to be expended by its employees in purchasing goods specifically from it. Whatever kind of firm it may be, it specializes in just one or, at most, a very few kinds of business. Yet its employees will almost certainly expend their higher wages in buying a wide variety of products, from a wide variety of firms.

The only way that an individual firm might expect to gain comparable additional sales revenues following its payment of additional wages is if the payment of additional wages takes place on the part of very many firms, throughout the economic system. In that case, while its employees spend most or all of their additional wages in buying from other firms, the employees of other firms may very possibly spend enough of their additional wages in buying from it, to provide it with additional sales revenues sufficient to match its additional payment of wages.

But even in this case, firms producing capital goods will not have additional sales revenues. This is because, in the nature of the case, all of the additional sales revenues accrue to the sellers of consumers’ goods. For it is consumers’ goods on which the additional wages are expended, not capital goods. All that the sellers of capital goods will have is additional costs of production, corresponding to their payment of additional wages.

Indeed, in any circumstances, even in the highly unrealistic case in which all firms sold nothing but consumers’ goods, there would be additional costs of production equal to the additional wages paid. The additional wages sooner or later always show up as equivalent additional costs of production. The consequence of additional costs of production equal to the payment of additional wages offsets the existence of additional sales revenues equal to the payment of additional wages.

Insofar as the effect of the payment of additional wages is the combination of additional sales revenues and additional costs of production, there can be no increase in profits in the economic system. In both being equal to the same thing—viz., the additional wages paid—the additional sales revenues and the additional costs are equal to each other. In the face of equal additions to sales revenues and costs, profits, the difference between sales revenues and costs, remain unchanged in the economic system in terms of their dollar amount. Equals added to unequals not only do not affect the amount of the inequality, but serve to reduce the percentage that the unchanged amount of profit constitutes of the now larger sales revenues and costs. Profit as a percentage of sales revenues and cost necessarily declines.

Furthermore, while it is not unreasonable to assume that the payment of additional wages results in equivalent additional expenditure by the wage earners and thus in equivalent additional sales revenues for sellers of consumers’ goods, it is by no means the case that it must result in an equivalent additional expenditure and sales revenues in the aggregate, i.e., for consumers’ goods and capital goods taken together. It might well be the case that the additional payment of wages comes at the expense of purchases of capital goods, notably the materials and machinery business firms buy. In that case, aggregate sales revenues in the economic system will be unchanged.

And if this is the case, then it is almost certain that business profits in the aggregate will substantially decline in amount as the result of an increase in wage payments. This is because expenditures for capital goods, especially machinery and buildings, show up as costs of production in business income statements much more slowly than do wage payments of equivalent amount. For example, an additional $1 billion of expenditure on wage payments is likely to show up as costs of production within a matter of weeks or months. However, that same $1 billion expended on machinery or buildings will show up as equivalent costs of production only over a period of years or even decades, as the machinery or buildings undergo depreciation.

Consequently, a shift in expenditure from machinery and buildings to wage payments would result in an increase in aggregate costs of production in the economic system in the current year, and many years thereafter, of the far greater part of the $1 billion. Profits in the economic system would equivalently fall because, in the conditions of the case, the increase in aggregate costs would occur in the face of aggregate sales revenues that were unchanged.

It should be realized here that by the same token, a decline in wage payments that made possible an equivalent rise in the expenditure for machinery or buildings would result in a substantial increase in profits in the economic system. This is because, in this case, aggregate costs of production in the economic system would fall as depreciation cost, representing a relatively modest fraction of the additional $1 billion that was now spent on machinery or buildings, replaced what would have been current operating costs representing the far greater part or all of the $1 billion otherwise spent in paying wages.

This conclusion, of course, flies in the face of the views of the labor unions and the Keynesians, who believe that reductions in wage rates reduce business profits insofar as they result in a reduction in total wage payments and consequently consumer spending. The truth, as I have just shown, is the exact opposite insofar as the reduction in wage payments serves to increase expenditure for durable capital goods.

Profits and the Average Period of Production

There is an abstract principle that is present in these examples, one that relates to the “Austrian” concept of the average period of production and the closely related Ricardian concept of the necessary lapse of time that takes place between expenditures for means of production and the receipt of proceeds from the sale of the ultimate consumers’ goods that result. The principle is that, other things being equal, a lengthening of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time brings about a transitory decrease in aggregate costs of production in the economic system and increase in profits in the economic system. By the same token, other things being equal, a shortening of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time brings about an increase in aggregate costs of production in the economic systems and decrease in profits in the economic system.

I describe the change in aggregate costs of production as “transitory” because ultimately, if the amount of spending for means of production, i.e., labor and capital goods, remains the same in the economic system year after year, costs of production will equal that amount of spending, irrespective of the length of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time. For example, on the scale of an individual company, $1 billion per year expended on labor and materials will probably result in $1 billion of annual costs of production for that company within little more than a year. That same $1 billion expended year after year in purchasing machinery with a depreciable life of 10 years, will result in annual depreciation costs of $1 billion after 10 years. At that point, 10 years’ of machinery purchases will be in place, with the purchases of each year resulting in $100 million of annual depreciation cost, or $1 billion in all. Similarly, the expenditure of $1 billion year after year for buildings with a 40-year depreciable life must result in $1 billion of annual depreciation cost once 40 years have passed. At that point, there will have been 40 years of building purchases. With each of those 40 years’ purchases resulting in an annual depreciation cost of one-fortieth of $1 billion, the total annual depreciation cost from than point on will be $1 billion.

So long as further lengthening of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time occurs, the process makes a further contribution to aggregate profitability. But once further lengthening ceases, the contribution to aggregate profitability comes to an end. (Mises implicitly recognizes the contribution to aggregate profit made by a lengthening of the period of production. See Human Action, 3d ed. rev. [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966], pp. 294-97.)

Profits and the Increase in the Quantity of Money/Volume of Spending

Nevertheless, there is a second factor connected with the passage of time in the productive process that can be gleaned from our discussion of the union argument concerning wage payments, and whose contribution to aggregate profitability is capable of being permanent. This factor is the increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending in the economic system.

The increase in wage payments so much desired by the unions could make a contribution to aggregate profits in the economic system insofar as it was financed by an increase in the quantity of money. (A decrease in the demand for money for cash holding would also have this effect. However, inasmuch as decreases in the demand for money for cash holding cannot go on indefinitely and, indeed, ultimately depend on increases in the quantity of money, they require no further separate discussion.)

Moreover, what serves to contribute to profits in the economic system here is in no way peculiar to higher wage payments. It is present equally in greater expenditures for materials and supplies and machinery and buildings, i.e., in greater expenditures for means of production as such.

The contribution to profits in the economic system derives from the fact that additional expenditures for means of production resulting from the increase in the quantity of money serve to raise sales revenues in the economic system immediately or almost immediately while they serve to increase the costs of production deducted from sales revenues only with a more or less considerable time lag. Thus, what business firms spend in buying capital goods is simultaneously sales revenues to the sellers of the capital goods. What they spend in paying wages shows up very quickly as additional sales revenues for sellers of consumers’ goods.

Consistent with the principles of business accounting, in the case of all goods sold out of inventory, additional costs of production appear in business income statements only as and when the goods produced from the means of production purchased for larger sums of money are sold. That often entails a lapse of time of several months, and, sometimes, several years. For example, the additional expenditures made by an automobile company for labor and materials will not show up as costs of production until the automobiles produced in the process are actually sold, at which time cost of goods sold is incurred. Such outlays made in November or December of a calendar year will not show up in the auto firms’ current-year income statements ending on December 31, but only in the income statements of the following year.

In the case of a distillery, producing aged whiskey, such time interval may be 8, 12, or 20 years, or even more. Of course, in the case of the machinery and buildings purchased by business firms, major time intervals are present everywhere before additional depreciation cost comes to equal the additional outlays.

In these intervals, sales revenues are increased without costs being increased, or increased equivalently, and thus profit emerges. And then, if the increase in the quantity of money and volume of spending is continuous, by the time costs do rise to reflect the higher level of expenditures made in purchasing the means of production, there are further increases in the expenditures for the means of production and thus in sales revenues. In other words, there is a continuing contribution to aggregate profit.

It follows from this discussion that a continuing given percentage increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending in the economic system tends to add an approximately equivalent percentage increase to the economy-wide average rate of profit/interest. For example, a continuing 2 percent annual increase tends to add approximately 2 percentage points to the rate of profit/interest on top of what it would otherwise have been. This conclusion follows by conceiving of outlays for means of production in any given year as being paired with receipts from the sale of consumers’ goods in definite future years. If the volume of spending and thus of sales revenues in the economic system were growing at some definite compound annual rate, an equivalent additional rate of return on those outlays would be implied.

For example, if with no increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending, an outlay for means of production of 10 would grow to sales revenues of 11 in a year, but now a 2 percent increase in money and spending makes it grow to 11.22, the rate of return on the outlay of 10 is increased from 10 percent to 12.2 percent, an increase of approximately 2 percentage points. In the same, way an outlay of 10 that would otherwise grow to (11/10) x (11/10) in 2 years, will now, with a compound annual increase of 2 percent in money and spending, grow to (11/10) x (11/10) x 1.02 x 1.02. Again, on an annualized basis, there will be an addition of approximately 2 percentage points to the rate of return. Since every dollar of sales revenues in the economic system can conceptually be paired with outlays for means of production made at one specific time or another in the past, a uniform compound annual increase in money and spending covering the entire time interval must have this effect everywhere.

The increase in the rate of return resulting from the increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending should not be dismissed as inflation. In a free market, under a gold standard, the quantity of money would increase and that increase, as Rothbard has convincingly shown, would not be inflation. Inflation, Rothbard showed, applies only to increases in the quantity of money more rapid than increases in the supply of gold. The modest increase in the quantity of money in a free economy and its gold standard would almost certainly be accompanied by increases in the production and supply of commodities in general that were at least as great and, most probably, significantly greater. The result would be falling prices. However, and this is a very significant finding, these falling prices would not at all be deflationary, because, as I have just shown, they would be accompanied by an increase in the average rate of return on capital rather than a decrease, which last is a leading symptom of any actual deflation.

In a free market and its gold standard, a reasonable scenario would be a 2 percent annual increase in the quantity of gold and spending in terms of gold, accompanied by a 3 or 4 percent annual increase in production and supply in general. The effect would be prices falling at an annual rate of 1 or 2 percent along with an approximate 2 percent addition to the average rate of return. The real rate of return, of course, would be elevated further, to the extent that prices fell.

There is a further very important conclusion to be drawn here, concerning the actual significance of the rate of return, the rate of profit/interest. And that is that to a very significant extent, the nominal rate of return is the reflection of nothing more than the increase in the quantity of money and volume of spending, while the real rate of return is the reflection of nothing more than the rate of increase in production and supply. In other words, at least to this extent, the rate of return cannot possibly be at anyone’s expense. It is the accompaniment and marker of more gold and of more goods in general, i.e., of economic progress and general improvement.

It must be pointed out that profits derived from lengthenings of the average period of production are also ultimately at no one's expense. To the contrary, in adding to the total of the capital employed in the economic system, they serve to increase the quantity and quality of the products produced. To the extent that these products are consumers' goods, the effect is a rise in real wages inasmuch as they are purchased overwhelmingly by wage earners. To the extent that the larger supply of products produced is capital goods, it serves to bring about a further increase in the supply of consumers' goods, and thus in real wages, and yet a further increase in the supply of capital goods, which in turn will have the same result. Continuing increases in the supply both of consumers' goods and capital goods, and thus continuing increases in real wages can occur.

The Rate of Return Under a Fixed Quantity of Money/Volume of Spending

In addition to increases in the quantity of money/volume of spending and lengthenings of the average period of production, there is a third source of profit in the economic system. This is the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists, i.e., the expenditure of businessmen/capitalists that is not for business purposes, not for the purpose of making subsequent sales.

Like the consumption expenditure of wage earners, this expenditure is a source of business sales revenues in the economic system. But, unlike the consumption expenditure of wage earners, it has no counterpart in expenditures that generate costs of production. Its sources are primarily dividends paid by corporations and the draw of funds from partnerships and sole proprietorships. These payments do not show up as costs of production on the part of the firms that pay them. They are simply a transfer of funds from the firms to their owner(s).

Their existence enables business sales revenues in the economic system to exceed the expenditures by business firms for means of production and thus also to exceed the equivalent costs of production generated by those expenditures. In this way, they are a source of profit in the economic system.

Interest payments by business firms are also a source of funds making possible consumption expenditure by businessmen/capitalists. Interest payments, of course, do show up equivalently in costs of production. Nevertheless, their existence helps to explain the existence of business profits pre-deduction of interest. And thus they help to explain the general rate of return on capital, which is calculated gross of interest. This rate of return—the rate of profit pre-deduction of interest—of course, is what determines the rate of interest. (In the terminology of Mises and most other economists of the “Austrian School,” these profits are called “originary interest.” Taken relative to capital invested, they constitute the rate of originary interest.)

Profits resulting from the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists would exist in the absence of further increases in the quantity of money/volume of spending. Their existence, moreover, acts to put an end to any indefinite prolongation of the average period of production. This is because, to be worthwhile, a lengthening of the average period of production requires that businessmen find that the investment of additional capital results in cost savings or revenue increases at the level of the individual firm sufficient to yield something more than the prevailing rate of return on capital. Thus, the higher is the prevailing rate of return, the greater is the obstacle in the way of additional investment being worthwhile. At the same time, the greater is the volume of capital that has already been accumulated in the economic system relative to sales revenues, the smaller is the contribution to costs savings or revenue increases that is likely to be made by the investment of still more capital and a further rise in the ratio of accumulated capital to sales revenues.

The implication of this discussion is that ultimately the rate of return in the economic system is determined by the combination of the rate of increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending and the ratio of the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists to their accumulated capitals.

The second factor is clearly the more fundamental and should be understood as a reflection of time preference. In conditions in which the annual consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists is on the order of 5 percent of their accumulated capitals, time preference is lower than in conditions in which it is on the order of 10 percent of their accumulated capitals. It is lower still in conditions in which it is on the order of 2 percent. In the first case, their capitals are sufficient to provide for the consumption of 20 years; in the second, for only 10 years; in the third, for 50 years. A lower time preference is required to make greater relative provision for the future.

Establishing the relationship between time preference and the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists relative to their capitals and, on that basis, to the rate of return on capital, serves to integrate time preference and its determination of the rate of return into “macroeconomics.”

Avoiding Confusions

It’s necessary to anticipate two possible confusions that may arise. One is the conviction that the claim that the consumption of businessmen/capitalists is a determinant of the rate of return on capital implies that to increase its rate of return, a company should increase its dividends and simply be sure that its stockholders consume the proceeds.

If enacted such a policy would, to some very modest extent, serve to increase the economy-wide average rate of return on capital. But the profits earned by the firm in question would be decimated. The extra profits would go to others, not to it. This is because such behavior would reduce its capital, which is an essential means of its competing for profits, by far more than it increased the economy-wide amount of profit.

For example, a huge firm, with a capital of $100 billion might increase its dividend by $10 billion and add $10 billion to the excess of sales revenues over expenditure for means of production in the economic system, and over costs equal to the now reduced expenditure for means of production. This would increase economy-wide profits from, say, $1 trillion to $1.01 trillion, a 1 percent increase. But at the same time, it would reduce the capital of this firm by 10 percent. Thus, the firm would be in a position to compete for its share of a 1 percent increase in profits in the economic system on the foundation of a capital that had been reduced by 10 percent. The profit it earned would thus certainly be much lower than it was before.

The second confusion that may arise is to ignore the fact that the discussion of profit in this article has been almost entirely at the level of the economic system as a whole, not at the level of the individual firm. As indicated in the last paragraph, competition exists at the level of the individual firm and plays a decisive role in determining its profits. Such factors as its relative efficiency and the relative quality of its products are vital for the profitability of the individual firm, but play little or no role in determining profits at the level of the economic system as a whole. This is because there competitive factors cancel out.

Summary

The central question that this article has been concerned with is what permits an excess of sales revenues over costs of production in the economic system as a whole. Here, as we have just seen, such things as producing a larger quantity of products more efficiently, or producing better products that can command premium prices, simply do not provide an explanation. This is because at the level of the economic system as a whole, they cancel out, with the profits of the more efficient, higher quality firms matched by the losses of the less efficient, lower quality firms.

The explanation of profit/interest in the economic system as a whole is provided by:

1) A shifting of expenditures for means of production from products and processes in which they show up more quickly as costs of production to be deducted from sales revenues, to products and processes in which they show up more slowly as costs of production to be deducted from sales revenues. In both cases, the same expenditure for means of production generates the same volume of sales revenues in the economic system, but in the second case costs are lower for a more or less considerable period of time, and thus profits are higher for that period of time. This, of course, represents a lengthening of the average period of production.

2) The increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending. This increase serves to increase sales revenues immediately or almost immediately while increasing the costs deducted from the sales revenues only with more or less substantial time lags. In the interval, profits are generated. The process is perpetuated by continuing increases in the quantity of money/volume of spending. At the same time that more money and spending add to profits and the rate of profit in terms of money, increases in the production and supply of ordinary goods can serve to prevent price increases or even result in price decreases, with the result that the nominal profits generated are accompanied by equivalent or greater real profits. This would be the situation in a free market and the gold standard.

3) The consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists. This is the source of sales revenues in excess of expenditure for means of production and of costs of production equal to those expenditures. It is the most fundamental source of profit in the economic system and ultimately rests on time preference.

Further Development of the Theory of Profit/Interest

I discuss all aspects of the present article at greater length, along with a host of other, related matters as well, in my book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. It will be helpful to provide a short bridge from this article to that book, in the form of the introduction of some new terminology.

In Capitalism, I refer to expenditure for means of production by business firms as productive expenditure, which is expenditure for the purpose of making subsequent sales. Productive expenditure is in sharpest contrast to consumption expenditure, which is expenditure not for the purpose of making subsequent sales, but for any other purpose.

Productive expenditure, of course, has two components: expenditure for capital goods and expenditure for labor—i.e., wage payments. Productive expenditure plays a twofold role in the generation of aggregate business profits: it is the source both of most of business sales revenues and of the costs business firms deduct from their sales revenues.

Productive expenditure can exceed costs deducted from sales revenues insofar as the costs it generates follow it with time lags. To the extent it does exceed costs, the sales revenues it generates also exceed those costs. There is profit.

Any excess of productive expenditure over costs is net investment. This is because, in accordance with the principles of business accounting, productive expenditure to a substantial extent constitutes additions to business asset accounts, notably, the gross plant and equipment and inventory/work in progress accounts. Expenditures on account of machinery or buildings add to the former; expenditures for materials add to the latter. Expenditures even for labor often represent additions to these accounts—for example the wages paid to workers constructing plant or to workers employed in the production of inventories.

Costs of production, on the other hand, largely represent subtractions from these accounts. Depreciation cost is a subtraction from gross plant and equipment. Cost of goods sold is a subtraction from inventory/work in progress. Thus, while productive expenditure adds to the asset accounts of business, cost of production subtracts from them. The difference between the sum of the additions and the sum of the subtractions is the net change, i.e., net investment.

Net investment reflects the effect both of changes in the length of the average period of production and changes in the quantity of money/volume of spending. The ratio of net investment in the economic system to accumulated capital in the economic system is the measure of the rate of profit/interest insofar as it is the result of these factors. In Capitalism, I call this ratio the “net investment rate.”

The rate of profit/interest in the economic system is explained by the combined operation of the net investment rate and one other rate, which I call the “net consumption rate.” Net consumption is the excess of spending for consumers’ goods over the wages paid by business firms. As explained, its primary source is the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists. Net consumption is also equal to the excess of business sales revenues in the economic system over productive expenditure. Inasmuch as the expenditure to buy capital goods is present equally both in business sales revenues and in productive expenditure, the difference between sales revenues and productive expenditure reduces to the difference between the part of sales revenues constituted by consumption expenditure and the part of productive expenditure constituted by wage payments, i.e., net consumption.

Perhaps the simplest way to conceive matters is by starting with the fact that profit is the difference between sales revenues and costs. Sales revenues minus costs equals sales revenues minus productive expenditure plus productive expenditure minus costs. The first part of the result is net consumption; the second part is net investment. Thus, profit equals the sum of net consumption plus net investment. The further result is that the rate of profit, i.e., the ratio of profit to accumulated capital, equals the sum of the rate of net consumption plus the rate of net investment, with each of these rates being understood as the result of respectively dividing net consumption and net investment by the amount of accumulated capital in the economic system.

This theory of profit/interest has major implications for the understanding of capital accumulation, the determination of real wages and the general standard of living, taxation, inflation/deflation, and the business cycle. It also provides the basis for the overthrow of virtually all aspects of Keynesianism and its system of national income accounting, along with an equally fundamental and thorough refutation of Marxism and the exploitation theory.

Copyright © 2011 by George Reisman. George Reisman, Ph.D., is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics, Senior Fellow at the Goldwater Institute, and the author of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. His website is http://www.capitalism.net/.

Raising Taxes Is Not Reducing Government Spending

Today’s New York Times carries an article titled “The Blur Between Spending and Taxes.” The author is Harvard Professor N. Gregory Mankiw.*

The essential theme of the article is that the government is spending when it decides to forgo tax revenue that it otherwise could have collected. Indeed, tax revenues forgone in the enactment of tax deductions, such as for interest payments on home mortgages or charitable contributions, and tax credits, such as for first-time homebuyers or adoptions, are now commonly described as “Tax Expenditures.” The thought is that the government is spending money in deciding not to take it in taxes and to allow the taxpayers to keep it.

The underlying assumption of those who hold this view is that the government already owns the funds in question whether it has collected them in taxes or not. The government is the alleged owner of funds that belong to the taxpayer and which it abstains from taking. It allegedly spends these funds in allowing the taxpayers to keep them.

The fundamental question is, who is the owner of the funds paid in taxes? Is it the citizens, who have earned the funds and who turn them over to the government under the threat of being fined or imprisoned, or even killed if they physically resist the government, or is it the government?

To the supporters of the principle of individual rights and limited government—the principle on the basis of which the United States was founded—the obvious answer is that the people own the tax revenues and, in paying them, financially support the government. To the supporters of an omnipotent government ruling over a citizenry of rightless serfs, the government is the owner both of the people’s possessions, which, allegedly, are theirs in name only, and, indeed, of the people themselves. It is on the basis of this belief that it follows that the government financially supports the people in not taxing away their wealth.

The defenders of individual rights need to remind the government that it does not pay or enrich anyone by allowing him to keep what is already his.

This truth has major implications for the subject of tax reform, which the Times’ article was written to address. Tax reform needs to consist exclusively of reductions in government spending and in taxes. It should not be based on massive tax increases resulting from the elimination of existing tax deductions and credits. It is actual government spending that must be reduced, not what people have up to now been able to avoid having to pay in support of that spending.

The notion of tax expenditures provides the pretext for massive tax increases in the name of reducing government spending. This notion must be cast aside, so that the target of tax reform will be reductions in actual government spending, which then must be followed by reductions in taxes. This is what must be done on a truly massive scale. To the extent that it is accomplished, the income tax can be progressively reduced, until it is ultimately eliminated altogether. At that point, all questions of income tax deductions and credits will have disappeared.

As matters stand, the notion that the absence of taxation constitutes government spending is setting the stage for the total perversion of genuine tax reform. It is being used in an effort to impose as much as a trillion dollars a year in new taxes disguised as a trillion dollars a year of reduced government spending. In the words of the Times’ article, “Erskine B. Bowles and Alan K. Simpson, the chairmen of President Obama’s deficit reduction commission, have taken at hard look at these tax expenditures—and they don’t like what they see. In their draft proposal, released earlier this month, they proposed doing away with tax expenditures, which together cost the Treasury over $1 trillion a year.”

This is the sum and substance of the concept of tax reform held not only by the Obama administration but also by cowardly Republicans and conservatives. Simpson was a Republican United States Senator from Wyoming for eighteen years. Mankiw, the author of the Times’ article, was chairman of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors from 2003 to 2005.

In sum, the danger exists that Left and Right are about to unite to accomplish a colossal political fraud in the form of enormous tax increases sold to an unsuspecting public as reductions in government spending. The American people need to stand up and refuse to accept any form of the absurdity that in not taxing them, the government is spending their money and that the path to lower spending and taxes is raising their taxes. The basis of tax reform must be reduced government spending, not higher taxes.

*The article appears on p. 5 of the Business Section of the November 21, 2010 issue.

Copyright © 2010 by George Reisman. George Reisman, Ph.D., is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics and the author of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. His website is www.capitalism.net.