WHERE PROFIT COMES FROM

Labor unions like to argue that the payment of higher wages is to the self-interest of employers because the wage earners will use their higher wages to make additional purchases from business firms, thereby increasing the sales revenues and profits of business firms. However, wrong and foolish it may be, this is an argument worth analyzing in some detail, because it can provide a gateway to a discussion of the actual sources of profit in the economic system.

The union argument, of course, ignores the fact that the business firms paying the higher wages and those earning the additional sales revenues and profits that are alleged to result are likely to be different firms. Indeed, insofar as any one, individual firm is considered, this will certainly be the case, if for no other reason than that very little, if any, of the additional wages paid by that one firm are likely to be expended by its employees in purchasing goods specifically from it. Whatever kind of firm it may be, it specializes in just one or, at most, a very few kinds of business. Yet its employees will almost certainly expend their higher wages in buying a wide variety of products, from a wide variety of firms.

The only way that an individual firm might expect to gain comparable additional sales revenues following its payment of additional wages is if the payment of additional wages takes place on the part of very many firms, throughout the economic system. In that case, while its employees spend most or all of their additional wages in buying from other firms, the employees of other firms may very possibly spend enough of their additional wages in buying from it, to provide it with additional sales revenues sufficient to match its additional payment of wages.

But even in this case, firms producing capital goods will not have additional sales revenues. This is because, in the nature of the case, all of the additional sales revenues accrue to the sellers of consumers’ goods. For it is consumers’ goods on which the additional wages are expended, not capital goods. All that the sellers of capital goods will have is additional costs of production, corresponding to their payment of additional wages.

Indeed, in any circumstances, even in the highly unrealistic case in which all firms sold nothing but consumers’ goods, there would be additional costs of production equal to the additional wages paid. The additional wages sooner or later always show up as equivalent additional costs of production. The consequence of additional costs of production equal to the payment of additional wages offsets the existence of additional sales revenues equal to the payment of additional wages.

Insofar as the effect of the payment of additional wages is the combination of additional sales revenues and additional costs of production, there can be no increase in profits in the economic system. In both being equal to the same thing—viz., the additional wages paid—the additional sales revenues and the additional costs are equal to each other. In the face of equal additions to sales revenues and costs, profits, the difference between sales revenues and costs, remain unchanged in the economic system in terms of their dollar amount. Equals added to unequals not only do not affect the amount of the inequality, but serve to reduce the percentage that the unchanged amount of profit constitutes of the now larger sales revenues and costs. Profit as a percentage of sales revenues and cost necessarily declines.

Furthermore, while it is not unreasonable to assume that the payment of additional wages results in equivalent additional expenditure by the wage earners and thus in equivalent additional sales revenues for sellers of consumers’ goods, it is by no means the case that it must result in an equivalent additional expenditure and sales revenues in the aggregate, i.e., for consumers’ goods and capital goods taken together. It might well be the case that the additional payment of wages comes at the expense of purchases of capital goods, notably the materials and machinery business firms buy. In that case, aggregate sales revenues in the economic system will be unchanged.

And if this is the case, then it is almost certain that business profits in the aggregate will substantially decline in amount as the result of an increase in wage payments. This is because expenditures for capital goods, especially machinery and buildings, show up as costs of production in business income statements much more slowly than do wage payments of equivalent amount. For example, an additional $1 billion of expenditure on wage payments is likely to show up as costs of production within a matter of weeks or months. However, that same $1 billion expended on machinery or buildings will show up as equivalent costs of production only over a period of years or even decades, as the machinery or buildings undergo depreciation.

Consequently, a shift in expenditure from machinery and buildings to wage payments would result in an increase in aggregate costs of production in the economic system in the current year, and many years thereafter, of the far greater part of the $1 billion. Profits in the economic system would equivalently fall because, in the conditions of the case, the increase in aggregate costs would occur in the face of aggregate sales revenues that were unchanged.

It should be realized here that by the same token, a decline in wage payments that made possible an equivalent rise in the expenditure for machinery or buildings would result in a substantial increase in profits in the economic system. This is because, in this case, aggregate costs of production in the economic system would fall as depreciation cost, representing a relatively modest fraction of the additional $1 billion that was now spent on machinery or buildings, replaced what would have been current operating costs representing the far greater part or all of the $1 billion otherwise spent in paying wages.

This conclusion, of course, flies in the face of the views of the labor unions and the Keynesians, who believe that reductions in wage rates reduce business profits insofar as they result in a reduction in total wage payments and consequently consumer spending. The truth, as I have just shown, is the exact opposite insofar as the reduction in wage payments serves to increase expenditure for durable capital goods.

Profits and the Average Period of Production

There is an abstract principle that is present in these examples, one that relates to the “Austrian” concept of the average period of production and the closely related Ricardian concept of the necessary lapse of time that takes place between expenditures for means of production and the receipt of proceeds from the sale of the ultimate consumers’ goods that result. The principle is that, other things being equal, a lengthening of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time brings about a transitory decrease in aggregate costs of production in the economic system and increase in profits in the economic system. By the same token, other things being equal, a shortening of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time brings about an increase in aggregate costs of production in the economic systems and decrease in profits in the economic system.

I describe the change in aggregate costs of production as “transitory” because ultimately, if the amount of spending for means of production, i.e., labor and capital goods, remains the same in the economic system year after year, costs of production will equal that amount of spending, irrespective of the length of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time. For example, on the scale of an individual company, $1 billion per year expended on labor and materials will probably result in $1 billion of annual costs of production for that company within little more than a year. That same $1 billion expended year after year in purchasing machinery with a depreciable life of 10 years, will result in annual depreciation costs of $1 billion after 10 years. At that point, 10 years’ of machinery purchases will be in place, with the purchases of each year resulting in $100 million of annual depreciation cost, or $1 billion in all. Similarly, the expenditure of $1 billion year after year for buildings with a 40-year depreciable life must result in $1 billion of annual depreciation cost once 40 years have passed. At that point, there will have been 40 years of building purchases. With each of those 40 years’ purchases resulting in an annual depreciation cost of one-fortieth of $1 billion, the total annual depreciation cost from than point on will be $1 billion.

So long as further lengthening of the average-period-of-production/necessary-lapse-of-time occurs, the process makes a further contribution to aggregate profitability. But once further lengthening ceases, the contribution to aggregate profitability comes to an end. (Mises implicitly recognizes the contribution to aggregate profit made by a lengthening of the period of production. See Human Action, 3d ed. rev. [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966], pp. 294-97.)

Profits and the Increase in the Quantity of Money/Volume of Spending

Nevertheless, there is a second factor connected with the passage of time in the productive process that can be gleaned from our discussion of the union argument concerning wage payments, and whose contribution to aggregate profitability is capable of being permanent. This factor is the increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending in the economic system.

The increase in wage payments so much desired by the unions could make a contribution to aggregate profits in the economic system insofar as it was financed by an increase in the quantity of money. (A decrease in the demand for money for cash holding would also have this effect. However, inasmuch as decreases in the demand for money for cash holding cannot go on indefinitely and, indeed, ultimately depend on increases in the quantity of money, they require no further separate discussion.)

Moreover, what serves to contribute to profits in the economic system here is in no way peculiar to higher wage payments. It is present equally in greater expenditures for materials and supplies and machinery and buildings, i.e., in greater expenditures for means of production as such.

The contribution to profits in the economic system derives from the fact that additional expenditures for means of production resulting from the increase in the quantity of money serve to raise sales revenues in the economic system immediately or almost immediately while they serve to increase the costs of production deducted from sales revenues only with a more or less considerable time lag. Thus, what business firms spend in buying capital goods is simultaneously sales revenues to the sellers of the capital goods. What they spend in paying wages shows up very quickly as additional sales revenues for sellers of consumers’ goods.

Consistent with the principles of business accounting, in the case of all goods sold out of inventory, additional costs of production appear in business income statements only as and when the goods produced from the means of production purchased for larger sums of money are sold. That often entails a lapse of time of several months, and, sometimes, several years. For example, the additional expenditures made by an automobile company for labor and materials will not show up as costs of production until the automobiles produced in the process are actually sold, at which time cost of goods sold is incurred. Such outlays made in November or December of a calendar year will not show up in the auto firms’ current-year income statements ending on December 31, but only in the income statements of the following year.

In the case of a distillery, producing aged whiskey, such time interval may be 8, 12, or 20 years, or even more. Of course, in the case of the machinery and buildings purchased by business firms, major time intervals are present everywhere before additional depreciation cost comes to equal the additional outlays.

In these intervals, sales revenues are increased without costs being increased, or increased equivalently, and thus profit emerges. And then, if the increase in the quantity of money and volume of spending is continuous, by the time costs do rise to reflect the higher level of expenditures made in purchasing the means of production, there are further increases in the expenditures for the means of production and thus in sales revenues. In other words, there is a continuing contribution to aggregate profit.

It follows from this discussion that a continuing given percentage increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending in the economic system tends to add an approximately equivalent percentage increase to the economy-wide average rate of profit/interest. For example, a continuing 2 percent annual increase tends to add approximately 2 percentage points to the rate of profit/interest on top of what it would otherwise have been. This conclusion follows by conceiving of outlays for means of production in any given year as being paired with receipts from the sale of consumers’ goods in definite future years. If the volume of spending and thus of sales revenues in the economic system were growing at some definite compound annual rate, an equivalent additional rate of return on those outlays would be implied.

For example, if with no increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending, an outlay for means of production of 10 would grow to sales revenues of 11 in a year, but now a 2 percent increase in money and spending makes it grow to 11.22, the rate of return on the outlay of 10 is increased from 10 percent to 12.2 percent, an increase of approximately 2 percentage points. In the same, way an outlay of 10 that would otherwise grow to (11/10) x (11/10) in 2 years, will now, with a compound annual increase of 2 percent in money and spending, grow to (11/10) x (11/10) x 1.02 x 1.02. Again, on an annualized basis, there will be an addition of approximately 2 percentage points to the rate of return. Since every dollar of sales revenues in the economic system can conceptually be paired with outlays for means of production made at one specific time or another in the past, a uniform compound annual increase in money and spending covering the entire time interval must have this effect everywhere.

The increase in the rate of return resulting from the increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending should not be dismissed as inflation. In a free market, under a gold standard, the quantity of money would increase and that increase, as Rothbard has convincingly shown, would not be inflation. Inflation, Rothbard showed, applies only to increases in the quantity of money more rapid than increases in the supply of gold. The modest increase in the quantity of money in a free economy and its gold standard would almost certainly be accompanied by increases in the production and supply of commodities in general that were at least as great and, most probably, significantly greater. The result would be falling prices. However, and this is a very significant finding, these falling prices would not at all be deflationary, because, as I have just shown, they would be accompanied by an increase in the average rate of return on capital rather than a decrease, which last is a leading symptom of any actual deflation.

In a free market and its gold standard, a reasonable scenario would be a 2 percent annual increase in the quantity of gold and spending in terms of gold, accompanied by a 3 or 4 percent annual increase in production and supply in general. The effect would be prices falling at an annual rate of 1 or 2 percent along with an approximate 2 percent addition to the average rate of return. The real rate of return, of course, would be elevated further, to the extent that prices fell.

There is a further very important conclusion to be drawn here, concerning the actual significance of the rate of return, the rate of profit/interest. And that is that to a very significant extent, the nominal rate of return is the reflection of nothing more than the increase in the quantity of money and volume of spending, while the real rate of return is the reflection of nothing more than the rate of increase in production and supply. In other words, at least to this extent, the rate of return cannot possibly be at anyone’s expense. It is the accompaniment and marker of more gold and of more goods in general, i.e., of economic progress and general improvement.

It must be pointed out that profits derived from lengthenings of the average period of production are also ultimately at no one's expense. To the contrary, in adding to the total of the capital employed in the economic system, they serve to increase the quantity and quality of the products produced. To the extent that these products are consumers' goods, the effect is a rise in real wages inasmuch as they are purchased overwhelmingly by wage earners. To the extent that the larger supply of products produced is capital goods, it serves to bring about a further increase in the supply of consumers' goods, and thus in real wages, and yet a further increase in the supply of capital goods, which in turn will have the same result. Continuing increases in the supply both of consumers' goods and capital goods, and thus continuing increases in real wages can occur.

The Rate of Return Under a Fixed Quantity of Money/Volume of Spending

In addition to increases in the quantity of money/volume of spending and lengthenings of the average period of production, there is a third source of profit in the economic system. This is the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists, i.e., the expenditure of businessmen/capitalists that is not for business purposes, not for the purpose of making subsequent sales.

Like the consumption expenditure of wage earners, this expenditure is a source of business sales revenues in the economic system. But, unlike the consumption expenditure of wage earners, it has no counterpart in expenditures that generate costs of production. Its sources are primarily dividends paid by corporations and the draw of funds from partnerships and sole proprietorships. These payments do not show up as costs of production on the part of the firms that pay them. They are simply a transfer of funds from the firms to their owner(s).

Their existence enables business sales revenues in the economic system to exceed the expenditures by business firms for means of production and thus also to exceed the equivalent costs of production generated by those expenditures. In this way, they are a source of profit in the economic system.

Interest payments by business firms are also a source of funds making possible consumption expenditure by businessmen/capitalists. Interest payments, of course, do show up equivalently in costs of production. Nevertheless, their existence helps to explain the existence of business profits pre-deduction of interest. And thus they help to explain the general rate of return on capital, which is calculated gross of interest. This rate of return—the rate of profit pre-deduction of interest—of course, is what determines the rate of interest. (In the terminology of Mises and most other economists of the “Austrian School,” these profits are called “originary interest.” Taken relative to capital invested, they constitute the rate of originary interest.)

Profits resulting from the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists would exist in the absence of further increases in the quantity of money/volume of spending. Their existence, moreover, acts to put an end to any indefinite prolongation of the average period of production. This is because, to be worthwhile, a lengthening of the average period of production requires that businessmen find that the investment of additional capital results in cost savings or revenue increases at the level of the individual firm sufficient to yield something more than the prevailing rate of return on capital. Thus, the higher is the prevailing rate of return, the greater is the obstacle in the way of additional investment being worthwhile. At the same time, the greater is the volume of capital that has already been accumulated in the economic system relative to sales revenues, the smaller is the contribution to costs savings or revenue increases that is likely to be made by the investment of still more capital and a further rise in the ratio of accumulated capital to sales revenues.

The implication of this discussion is that ultimately the rate of return in the economic system is determined by the combination of the rate of increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending and the ratio of the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists to their accumulated capitals.

The second factor is clearly the more fundamental and should be understood as a reflection of time preference. In conditions in which the annual consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists is on the order of 5 percent of their accumulated capitals, time preference is lower than in conditions in which it is on the order of 10 percent of their accumulated capitals. It is lower still in conditions in which it is on the order of 2 percent. In the first case, their capitals are sufficient to provide for the consumption of 20 years; in the second, for only 10 years; in the third, for 50 years. A lower time preference is required to make greater relative provision for the future.

Establishing the relationship between time preference and the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists relative to their capitals and, on that basis, to the rate of return on capital, serves to integrate time preference and its determination of the rate of return into “macroeconomics.”

Avoiding Confusions

It’s necessary to anticipate two possible confusions that may arise. One is the conviction that the claim that the consumption of businessmen/capitalists is a determinant of the rate of return on capital implies that to increase its rate of return, a company should increase its dividends and simply be sure that its stockholders consume the proceeds.

If enacted such a policy would, to some very modest extent, serve to increase the economy-wide average rate of return on capital. But the profits earned by the firm in question would be decimated. The extra profits would go to others, not to it. This is because such behavior would reduce its capital, which is an essential means of its competing for profits, by far more than it increased the economy-wide amount of profit.

For example, a huge firm, with a capital of $100 billion might increase its dividend by $10 billion and add $10 billion to the excess of sales revenues over expenditure for means of production in the economic system, and over costs equal to the now reduced expenditure for means of production. This would increase economy-wide profits from, say, $1 trillion to $1.01 trillion, a 1 percent increase. But at the same time, it would reduce the capital of this firm by 10 percent. Thus, the firm would be in a position to compete for its share of a 1 percent increase in profits in the economic system on the foundation of a capital that had been reduced by 10 percent. The profit it earned would thus certainly be much lower than it was before.

The second confusion that may arise is to ignore the fact that the discussion of profit in this article has been almost entirely at the level of the economic system as a whole, not at the level of the individual firm. As indicated in the last paragraph, competition exists at the level of the individual firm and plays a decisive role in determining its profits. Such factors as its relative efficiency and the relative quality of its products are vital for the profitability of the individual firm, but play little or no role in determining profits at the level of the economic system as a whole. This is because there competitive factors cancel out.

Summary

The central question that this article has been concerned with is what permits an excess of sales revenues over costs of production in the economic system as a whole. Here, as we have just seen, such things as producing a larger quantity of products more efficiently, or producing better products that can command premium prices, simply do not provide an explanation. This is because at the level of the economic system as a whole, they cancel out, with the profits of the more efficient, higher quality firms matched by the losses of the less efficient, lower quality firms.

The explanation of profit/interest in the economic system as a whole is provided by:

1) A shifting of expenditures for means of production from products and processes in which they show up more quickly as costs of production to be deducted from sales revenues, to products and processes in which they show up more slowly as costs of production to be deducted from sales revenues. In both cases, the same expenditure for means of production generates the same volume of sales revenues in the economic system, but in the second case costs are lower for a more or less considerable period of time, and thus profits are higher for that period of time. This, of course, represents a lengthening of the average period of production.

2) The increase in the quantity of money/volume of spending. This increase serves to increase sales revenues immediately or almost immediately while increasing the costs deducted from the sales revenues only with more or less substantial time lags. In the interval, profits are generated. The process is perpetuated by continuing increases in the quantity of money/volume of spending. At the same time that more money and spending add to profits and the rate of profit in terms of money, increases in the production and supply of ordinary goods can serve to prevent price increases or even result in price decreases, with the result that the nominal profits generated are accompanied by equivalent or greater real profits. This would be the situation in a free market and the gold standard.

3) The consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists. This is the source of sales revenues in excess of expenditure for means of production and of costs of production equal to those expenditures. It is the most fundamental source of profit in the economic system and ultimately rests on time preference.

Further Development of the Theory of Profit/Interest

I discuss all aspects of the present article at greater length, along with a host of other, related matters as well, in my book Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. It will be helpful to provide a short bridge from this article to that book, in the form of the introduction of some new terminology.

In Capitalism, I refer to expenditure for means of production by business firms as productive expenditure, which is expenditure for the purpose of making subsequent sales. Productive expenditure is in sharpest contrast to consumption expenditure, which is expenditure not for the purpose of making subsequent sales, but for any other purpose.

Productive expenditure, of course, has two components: expenditure for capital goods and expenditure for labor—i.e., wage payments. Productive expenditure plays a twofold role in the generation of aggregate business profits: it is the source both of most of business sales revenues and of the costs business firms deduct from their sales revenues.

Productive expenditure can exceed costs deducted from sales revenues insofar as the costs it generates follow it with time lags. To the extent it does exceed costs, the sales revenues it generates also exceed those costs. There is profit.

Any excess of productive expenditure over costs is net investment. This is because, in accordance with the principles of business accounting, productive expenditure to a substantial extent constitutes additions to business asset accounts, notably, the gross plant and equipment and inventory/work in progress accounts. Expenditures on account of machinery or buildings add to the former; expenditures for materials add to the latter. Expenditures even for labor often represent additions to these accounts—for example the wages paid to workers constructing plant or to workers employed in the production of inventories.

Costs of production, on the other hand, largely represent subtractions from these accounts. Depreciation cost is a subtraction from gross plant and equipment. Cost of goods sold is a subtraction from inventory/work in progress. Thus, while productive expenditure adds to the asset accounts of business, cost of production subtracts from them. The difference between the sum of the additions and the sum of the subtractions is the net change, i.e., net investment.

Net investment reflects the effect both of changes in the length of the average period of production and changes in the quantity of money/volume of spending. The ratio of net investment in the economic system to accumulated capital in the economic system is the measure of the rate of profit/interest insofar as it is the result of these factors. In Capitalism, I call this ratio the “net investment rate.”

The rate of profit/interest in the economic system is explained by the combined operation of the net investment rate and one other rate, which I call the “net consumption rate.” Net consumption is the excess of spending for consumers’ goods over the wages paid by business firms. As explained, its primary source is the consumption expenditure of businessmen/capitalists. Net consumption is also equal to the excess of business sales revenues in the economic system over productive expenditure. Inasmuch as the expenditure to buy capital goods is present equally both in business sales revenues and in productive expenditure, the difference between sales revenues and productive expenditure reduces to the difference between the part of sales revenues constituted by consumption expenditure and the part of productive expenditure constituted by wage payments, i.e., net consumption.

Perhaps the simplest way to conceive matters is by starting with the fact that profit is the difference between sales revenues and costs. Sales revenues minus costs equals sales revenues minus productive expenditure plus productive expenditure minus costs. The first part of the result is net consumption; the second part is net investment. Thus, profit equals the sum of net consumption plus net investment. The further result is that the rate of profit, i.e., the ratio of profit to accumulated capital, equals the sum of the rate of net consumption plus the rate of net investment, with each of these rates being understood as the result of respectively dividing net consumption and net investment by the amount of accumulated capital in the economic system.

This theory of profit/interest has major implications for the understanding of capital accumulation, the determination of real wages and the general standard of living, taxation, inflation/deflation, and the business cycle. It also provides the basis for the overthrow of virtually all aspects of Keynesianism and its system of national income accounting, along with an equally fundamental and thorough refutation of Marxism and the exploitation theory.

Copyright © 2011 by George Reisman. George Reisman, Ph.D., is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics, Senior Fellow at the Goldwater Institute, and the author of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics. His website is http://www.capitalism.net/.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY REQUIRES CAPITAL ACCUMULATION NOT GOVERNMENT “STIMULUS PACKAGES”

Part II: Stimulus Packages

Previously: Part I: Capital, Saving, and Our Economic Crisis

The Nature of Stimulus Packages

As was shown in Part I of this article, economic recovery requires greater saving and the accumulation of fresh capital, to make up for the losses caused by credit expansion and the malinvestment and overconsumption that follow from it. Yet the imposition of “stimulus packages” results in the further loss of capital. The Keynesians not only do not know this, but would not care even if they did know it.

Because of their ignorance of the role of capital in the economic system and resulting inability to see even the clearest evidence that suggests it, the Keynesians can conceive of no cause of a recession or depression but an insufficiency of consumption and no remedy but an increase in consumption. This is the basis of their calls for “stimulus packages” of one kind or another.

They assume that the economic system always has enough capital, indeed, that it is in danger of having too much capital, and that the problem is simply to get it to use the capital that it has. The way that this is done, they believe, is to get people to consume. Additional consumption will be the “stimulus” to new and additional production. When people consume, the products of past production are taken off the shelves and disappear from the stores. These products, the Keynesians believe, now require replacement. Hence, the shops will order replacement supplies and the manufacturers will turn to producing them, and thus the economic system will be operating again and recovery will be achieved, provided the “stimulus” is large enough.

The essential meaning of a “stimulus package” is the government’s financing of consumption, indeed, practically any consumption, by anyone, for almost any purpose, in the conviction that this will cause an increase in employment and production as the means of replacing what is consumed. Despite talk of avoiding wasteful spending and being “careful with the taxpayers’ money,” the truth is that from the point of view of the advocates of economic stimulus, the bigger and more wasteful the project, the better.

This was made brilliantly clear many years ago by Henry Hazlitt, who chose the example of government spending for a bridge. It is one thing, Hazlitt showed, if the government builds a bridge because its construction is necessary to facilitate the flow of traffic. It is a very different matter, he pointed out, if the government builds the bridge for the purpose of promoting employment. In the first case, the government wants the best bridge for the lowest possible cost, which implies the employment of as few workers as possible, both in the construction of the bridge and in the production of any of the materials that go into it.

In the second case, that of stimulating employment, the government wants a bridge that requires as many workers as possible, for their employment is its actual purpose. The greater the number of workers employed, of course, the greater must be the cost of the bridge.

Indeed, no one could be more clear or explicit concerning the nature of government “fiscal policy” and its “stimuli” than Keynes himself, who declared (on p. 129 of his General Theory) that “Pyramid building, earthquakes, even wars may serve to increase wealth, if the education of our statesmen on the principles of the classical economics stands in the way of anything better.”

Acts of sheer destruction, such as wars and natural disasters, appear as beneficial to Keynes and his followers for the same reason that the “stimulus” of government-financed consumption appears beneficial. This is because they too create a need for replacement and thus allegedly result in an increase in employment and production. So widespread is this view that one can very often hear people openly express favorable opinions about the alleged economic benefits of such things as earthquakes, hurricanes, and even wars.

Stimulus Packages Mean More Loss of Capital

Despite the fact that what the economic system needs for recovery is saving and the accumulation of new capital, to replace as far as possible the capital that has been lost, the effect of stimulus packages is further to reduce the supply of capital, and thus to worsen the recession or depression.

The reason that stimulus packages cause a further loss of capital is that their starting point is the consumption of previously produced wealth. That wealth is part of the capital of the business firms that own it. The stimulus programs offer money in exchange for this wealth and capital. But the money they offer does not come from the production of any comparable wealth by the government or those to whom it gives money—wealth which has had to be produced and sold and thus put into the economic system prior to the withdrawal that now takes place. The starting point for the government and its dependents is an act of consumption, which means a using up, a loss of previously existing wealth in the form of capital.

The supporters of stimulus packages look to the fresh production that is required to replace the wealth that has been consumed. It will require the performance of additional labor. They are delighted to the extent that this fresh production and additional employment materialize. They believe that at that point their mission has been accomplished. They have succeeded in generating new and additional economic activity, new and additional employment. The only shortcoming of such a policy, they believe, is that it may not be applied on a sufficiently large scale.

Unfortunately, there is something they have overlooked. And that is the fact that any fresh production and employment that results is incapable by itself of replacing the capital that was consumed in starting the process. The reason for this is that all production, including any new and additional production called into being by stimulus packages, itself entails consumption. And this consumption tends at the very least to approximate the fresh production and, indeed, is capable of equaling or even exceeding it.

Thus, for example, we start with the purchase and consumption of a new television set by someone who has not previously produced and sold anything of equivalent monetary value that provided the funds for his now buying the television set. He has simply received the money from the government. In this case, what we have is one television set withdrawn from the capital of the economic system and placed in the hands of a non-producing consumer.

We can assume, for the sake of argument, that the retailer of the television set will order a replacement set from the wholesaler, and that the wholesaler in turn will order a replacement set from the manufacturer. We can assume further that the manufacturer will now produce a new television set to replace the one that he sells to the wholesaler from his inventory.

The production of the replacement television set entails a using up of materials and components and part of the useful life of the plant and equipment required. Aspects of such using up of capital goods also take place on the part of the retailer and wholesaler and in the transportation of the television set.

Very importantly, any new and additional workers who may be employed—precisely the goal of the whole operation—in producing a new television set or in moving a television set through the channels of distribution must be paid wages, which they in turn will consume. The goods these workers receive when they spend their wages represents a further depletion of inventories, on the part of all the retailers with whom they deal. In addition, the various business firms involved have additional profits, or at least diminished losses, as the result of the various additional purchases. This enables their owners to consume more and probably results in the payment of additional taxes, which the government consumes.

Even whatever depreciation allowances are earned along the way in the various stages of replacing the television set are likely to be consumed. This is because in the context of a recession or depression investors are afraid of losses if they invest in private businesses and thus prefer to invest in short-term treasury securities, such as treasury bills, which they consider to be far safer. But when depreciation allowances are used to purchase treasury securities, they end up financing consumption rather than capital replacement. This is because the Treasury uses the proceeds from the sale of its securities to finance nothing but consumption, either that of the government itself or that of the private individuals to whom the government gives money.

The point here is that any replacement of a good consumed by a non-producer itself entails very substantial additional consumption of inventories and the useful life of plant and equipment of business firms. The same is obviously true of the replacement of goods that have simply been destroyed, whether by war or by an act of nature.

No matter how long the process of spending and respending of the funds introduced into the economic system by a stimulus package might continue—no matter how many instances of replacement production there might be following the purchase and consumption of our hypothetical television set or of any other such good—the initial loss of capital need never be made up.

This is because each act of replacement production is accompanied by corresponding additional consumption. Thus the initial act of consumption—or destruction—of wealth and capital may be followed by 10 or 100 acts of subsequent production, each carried on in order to replace the goods used up before it. But if each of these subsequent acts of production is accompanied by fresh consumption that is equivalent to it, the net effect is still one act of consumption. As a result, the supply of capital is reduced. For what is always present is X instances of production respectively following X+1 instances of consumption.

Now countries have suffered enormous losses of capital and yet still managed to recover and go on to new heights of wealth and prosperity. Germany and Japan in the decades following World War II are perhaps the most outstanding examples of this.

What enabled them to recover was not further acts of consumption, not “stimulus packages” of any kind, but increases in production in excess—substantially in excess—of increases in consumption. That is to say, it was a process of saving and capital accumulation that made their recovery possible. On average, people in those countries, in those years, saved and reinvested a major portion of their income, often in excess of 25 percent.

It is possible, but highly unlikely, that the replacement production induced by an initial consumption/destruction of wealth might itself entail some such new saving. If round after round of replacement production were in fact accompanied by some such saving, then, eventually, the original loss of capital would be made good. But that would be the case only if such saving was not offset by fresh acts of “stimulus” or other policies that waste or destroy capital.

However, as I say, such an outcome is highly unlikely. If for no other reason, this is because, as I have already pointed out, the stimulus packages take place in an environment in which investors fear to invest in private firms. As a result, they use not only whatever new and additional savings they might make, for the purpose of buying “safe” treasury securities but also even funds they earn that are required for the replacement of capital goods. In this way, savings are diverted into consumption rather than capital accumulation.

(It is ironic that while, if it did manage to occur and was not diverted into consumption, such saving might mitigate the effects of a stimulus package, it is attacked as undermining the process of recovery. Thus, for example, Paul Krugman, the 2008 Nobel Prize winner in economics, writes: “Meanwhile, it’s clear that when it comes to economic stimulus, public spending provides much more bang for the buck than tax cuts…because a large fraction of any tax cut will simply be saved.” New York Times, January 26, 2009, p. A23.)

In addition to the diversion into consumption of such new savings as might occur subsequent to a “stimulus,” there is the fact that the source of any such saving, namely, the net product produced, is likely to be greatly diminished. The net product is the excess of the product produced over the capital goods used up in order to produce it. It is what is available for consumption or saving out of current wage, profit, and interest income.

The net product is diminished to the extent that production is made to take place in accordance with methods requiring the employment of unnecessary capital goods per unit of output. Environmental and consumer product safety legislation provide numerous instances of this kind.

For example, requiring gas stations, dry-cleaning establishments, and many other types of businesses to substantially increase their capital investments merely in order to placate the largely groundless fears of the environmental movement. Similarly, requiring safety features in automobiles, dishwashers, display cases, ice machines, stepladders, and countless other goods—features that the market does not judge to be worth their cost—adds to the cost of the materials and components that enter into the production of products without increasing the perceived value of the products. In both instances, the result is a larger consumption of capital goods but no increase in production, and thus a reduction in the size of the net product produced and thus in the ability to engage in saving out of current income.

As indicated in Part I of this article, the effect of capital decumulation, whether caused by stimulus packages or anything else, is a reduction in the ability of the economic system to produce, to employ labor, and to provide credit, for each of these things depends on capital. The reduced ability to produce and employ labor may not be apparent in the midst of mass unemployment. But it will become apparent if and when economic recovery begins. At that point, the economic system will be less capable than it otherwise would have been, because of the reduction in its supply of capital. Real wages and the general standard of living will be lower than they otherwise would have been. And all along, the ability to grant credit will be less than it otherwise would have been.

Stimulus Packages Are a Drain on the Rest of the Economic System

Even though stimulus packages may be able to generate additional economic activity, they cannot achieve any kind of meaningful economic recovery. Their actual effect is the creation of a system of public welfare in the guise of work. That is in the nature of employing people not for the sake of the products they produce but having them produce products for the sake of being able to employ them.

But stimulus packages are much more costly than simple welfare. On top of the welfare dole that allows unemployed workers to live, stimulus packages add the cost of the materials and equipment that the workers use in producing their pretended products.

The work created by stimulus packages is a make-believe work that is carried on at the expense of the rest of the economic system. It draws products and services produced in the rest of the economic system and returns to the rest of the economic system little or nothing in the way of goods or services that would constitute value for value or payment of any kind. In other words, stimulus packages and the needless work they create cause the great majority of other people to be poorer. I’ve already shown how they cause them to have less capital. Shortly, I will show how they also cause them to consume less. (For elaboration on this point, please see the forthcoming republication of my article “Who Pays for `Full Employment’?”)

Rising Prices in the Midst of Mass Unemployment

If economic recovery is to be achieved, the first thing that must be done is to stop “stimulus packages” and undo as far as possible any that are already in progress. This is because their effect is to worsen the problem of loss of capital that is the underlying cause of the economic crisis in the first place.

Unfortunately, they are not likely to be stopped. If they are implemented, especially on the scale already approved by Congress, the effect will be a decumulation of capital up to the point where scarcities of capital goods, including inventories of consumers’ goods in the possession of business firms, start to drive up prices.

Higher prices of consumers’ goods will result not only from scarcities of consumers’ goods (which, of course, are capital goods so long as they are in the hands of business firms), but also from scarcities of capital goods further back in the process of production. Thus a scarcity of steel sheet will not only raise the price of steel sheet, but will carry forward to the price of automobiles via the higher cost of producing automobiles that results from a rise in the price of steel sheet. Likewise, a scarcity of iron ore will carry forward to the price of steel sheet, which, again, will carry forward to the price of automobiles. And, of course, the pattern will be the same throughout the economic system, in such further cases as oil and oil products, cotton and cotton products, wheat and wheat products, and so on.

A rise in the prices of consumers’ goods is capable of stopping further capital decumulation stemming from the stimulus packages. When the point is reached that additional funds spent on consumers’ goods serve merely to raise their prices, then no additional quantities of them are sold. The same quantities are sold at higher prices. This ends the decumulation of inventories. From this point on, the buyers who obtain their funds from the government consume at the expense of people who have earned their incomes but now get less for them.

Once inventories become scarce in relation to the spending for goods, all of the funds that the government has been pouring into the economic system become capable of launching a major increase in prices. This rise in prices can take place even in the midst of mass unemployment. This is because the abundance of unemployed workers does nothing to mitigate the scarcity of capital goods that has occurred as the result of the attempts to stimulate employment.

Even though rising prices can deprive stimulus packages of the ability to cause further capital decumulation, the inflation of the money supply by the government results in continuing capital decumulation. In large part, this occurs as the result of the fact that the additional spending resulting from a larger money supply raises business sales revenues immediately while it raises business costs only with a time lag. So long as this goes on, profits are artificially increased.

Despite the fact that most or all of the additional profits may be required simply in order to replace assets at higher prices, the additional profits are taxed as though they were genuine gains. This impairs the ability of firms to replace their assets. The destructive consequences of this phenomenon can be seen in the transformation of what was once America’s industrial heartland into the “rustbelt.”

At the same time, throughout the economic system, starting long before today’s stimulus packages and continuing on alongside them, regular, almost year-in, year-out government budget deficits do their work of destruction. They cause a continuing diversion into consumption not only of a considerable part of whatever savings might be made out of income but also of the replacement allowances for the using up of plant and equipment and all other fixed assets. Generations of government budget deficits have sucked up trillions of dollars of what would have been capital funds and have gone a long way toward turning America into an industrial wasteland.

The blind rush into massive “stimulus packages” is the culmination of generations of economic ignorance transmitted from professor to student in the guise of advanced, revolutionary thinking—the “Keynesian revolution.” The accelerating destruction of our economic system that we are now experiencing is the product of a prior destruction of economic thought. Our entire intellectual establishment has been the victim—the willing victim—of a massive intellectual con job that goes under the name “Keynesianism.” And we are now paying the price.

I say, willing victims of an intellectual con job. What other description can there be of those who were ready to hail as a genius the man who wrote, “Pyramid building, earthquakes, even wars may serve to increase wealth….”

Only a brave few—most notably Ludwig von Mises and Henry Hazlitt— stood apart from this madness, and for doing so, they were made intellectual pariahs. But the time is coming when it will be clear to all who think that it is they who have had the last word.


*Copyright © 2009, by George Reisman. George Reisman, Ph.D. is the author of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996) and is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Goldwater Institute. His web site is www.capitalism.net and his blog is www.georgereisman.com/blog/. A pdf replica of his book can be downloaded to the reader’s hard drive simply by clicking on the book’s title Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics and then saving the file when it appears on the screen. The book provides an in-depth, comprehensive treatment of the material discussed in this and subsequent articles in this series and of practically all related aspects of economics.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY REQUIRES CAPITAL ACCUMULATION NOT GOVERNMENT “STIMULUS PACKAGES”

This two-part article is the second in a series of articles that seeks to provide the intelligent layman with sufficient knowledge of sound economic theory to enable him to understand what must be done to overcome the present financial crisis and return to the path of economic progress and prosperity. The first article in the series was “Falling Prices Are Not Deflation but the Antidote to Deflation.”

Part I: Capital, Saving, and Our Economic Crisis

Imagine an individual who is lethargic and lacks the energy to function at his normal level because of too little sleep. There are drugs that can make him feel fully refreshed, even after a night without any sleep whatever, and apparently capable of functioning the next day with full efficiency.

Nevertheless taking such drugs is definitely not a good idea. This is because the individual’s underlying problem of insufficient sleep is not only not addressed by his being stimulated but is actually worsened. For the stimulus further depletes his body’s already diminished energy reserves and takes him down the path of utter exhaustion.

This description applies to the current slowdown in our economic system and to the efforts to overcome it through the use of “fiscal policy” and its “stimulus packages.” The meaning of these terms is more government spending and lower taxes specifically designed to promote consumption. This includes giving income-tax refunds to people who paid no income tax and who, because of their low incomes, can presumably be most counted on to rush out and consume more as soon as additional funds are put in their hands.

The main difference between such economic “stimulants” and pharmaceutical stimulants is that the economic stimulants will not succeed even in temporarily restoring the economic system to anything approaching its normal level of activity.

An economic system entering into a major recession or depression is in a situation very similar to that of our imaginary, sleep-deprived individual. All that one need do is substitute for the loss of the sleep required for the body’s proper functioning the loss of something required for the proper functioning of the economic system.

Capital

In the case of the economic system, that something is capital. The economic system is not functioning properly because it has lost capital. Capital is the accumulated wealth that is owned by business enterprises or individuals and that is used for the purpose of earning profit or interest.

Capital embraces all of the farms, factories, mines, machinery and all other equipment, means of transportation and communication, warehouses, shops, office buildings, rental housing, and inventories of materials, components, supplies, semi-manufactures, and finished goods that are owned by business firms.

Capital also embraces the money that is owned by business firms, though money is in a special category. In addition, it embraces funds that have been lent to consumers at interest, for the purpose of buying consumers’ goods such as houses, automobiles, appliances, and anything else that is too expensive to be paid for out of the income earned in one pay period and for which the purchaser himself does not have sufficient savings.

The amount of capital in an economic system determines its ability to produce goods and services and to employ labor, and also to purchase consumers’ goods on credit. The greater the capital, the greater the ability to do all of these things; the less the capital, the less the ability to do any of these things.

Saving

Capital is accumulated on a foundation of saving. Saving is the act of abstaining from consuming funds that have been earned in the sale of goods or services.

Saving does not mean not spending. It does not mean hoarding. It means not spending for purposes of consumption. Abstaining from spending for consumption makes possible equivalent spending for production. Whoever saves is in a position to that extent to buy capital goods and pay wages to workers, to lend funds for the purchase of expensive consumers’ goods, or to lend funds to others who will use them for any of these purposes.

It is necessary to stress these facts because of the prevailing state of utter ignorance on the subject. Such ignorance is typified by a casual statement made in a recent New York Times news article. The statement was offered in the conviction that its truth was so well established as to be non-controversial. It claimed that “A dollar saved does not circulate through the economy and higher savings rates translate into fewer sales and lower revenue for struggling businesses.” (Jack Healy, “Consumers Are Saving More and Spending Less,” February 3, 2009, p. B3.)

The writer of the article apparently believes that houses and other expensive consumers’ goods are purchased out of the earnings of a single week or month, which is the normal range of time between paychecks. If that were the case, no savings would be necessary in order to purchase them. In fact, of course, the purchase of a house typically requires a sum equal to the purchaser’s entire income of three years or more; that of an automobile, the income of several months; and that of countless other goods, too large a fraction of the income of just one pay period to be affordable out of such limited funds.

In all such cases, a process of saving is essential for the purchase of consumers’ goods. The savings accumulated may be those of the purchaser himself, or they may be borrowed, or be partly the purchaser’s own and partly borrowed. But, in every case, savings are essential for the purchase of expensive consumers’ goods.

The Times reporter, and all of his colleagues, and the professors who supposedly educated him and his colleagues, all of whom spout such nonsense about saving, also do not know other, even more important facts abut saving. They do not know that saving is the precondition of retailers being able to buy goods from wholesalers, of wholesalers being able to buy goods from manufacturers, of manufacturers, and all other producers, being able to buy goods from their suppliers, and so on and on. It is also the precondition of sellers at any and all stages being able to pay wages.

Such expenditures must generally be made and paid for prior to the purchaser’s receipt of money from the sale of his own goods that will ultimately result. For example, automobile and steel companies cannot pay their workers and suppliers out of the receipts from the sale of the automobiles that will eventually come in as the result of using the labor and capital goods purchased. And even in the cases in which the payments to suppliers are made out of receipts from the sale of the resulting goods, the seller must abstain from consuming those funds, i.e., he must save them and use them to pay for the capital goods and labor he previously purchased.

In contrast, the Keynesian reporters and professors believe that sellers do nothing but consume or hoard cash. They are too dull to realize that if that were really the case, there would be no demand for anything but consumers’ goods. This becomes clear simply by following the pattern of the Keynesian textbooks in allegedly describing the process of spending.

Thus a consumer buys, say, $100 dollars worth of shirts in a department store; the owner of the department store, following his Keynesian “marginal propensity to consume” of .75, then buys $75 worth of food in a restaurant, and allegedly hoards the other $25 of his income; the owner of the restaurant then buys $56.25 (.75 x $75) worth of books, while allegedly hoarding the remaining $18.75 of his income; and so on and on. Now, unknown to the Keynesians, if such a sequence of spending actually took place, all that would exist is a sum of consumption expenditures and nothing else.

The fact is that most spending in the economic system rests on a foundation of saving. The seller of the shirts will likely save and productively expend $95 or more in buying replacement shirts and in paying his employees and making other purchases necessary for the conduct of his business, and perhaps only $5 on consumption. And so it will be for those who sell to him, or to the suppliers of his suppliers, or to the suppliers of those suppliers, and so on.

Any business income statement can provide a simple confirmation of such facts. The ratio of costs to sales revenues that can be derived from it, is an indicator of the ratio of the use of savings to make expenditures for labor and capital goods relative to sales revenues. For the costs it shows are a reflection of expenditures for labor and capital goods made in the past. The saving and productive expenditure out of current sales revenues will show up as costs in the future. The higher is the ratio of costs to sales, the higher is the degree of saving and productive expenditure relative to sales revenues. A firm with costs of $95 and sales revenues of $100 is a firm that can be understood as saving and productively expending $95 out of its $100 of sales revenues. This relationship applies throughout the economic system.


Hoarding Versus Saving

To the extent that “hoarding” or, more accurately, an increase in the demand for money for cash holding takes place, it is not because people have decided to save. What is actually going on is that business firms and investors have decided that they need to change the composition of their already accumulated savings in favor of holding more cash and less of other assets.

For example, an individual may decide that instead of being 90 percent invested in stocks and other securities and having only 10 percent of his savings in cash in his checking account, he needs to increase his cash holding to 20 or 25 percent of his savings.

Similarly, a corporation may decide that it needs to increase its cash holding relative to its other assets in order to be better able to meet its bills coming due. Indeed, this is happening right now as more and more firms find that they can no longer count on being able to borrow money for such purposes.

Furthermore, the increases in cash holdings that take place in such circumstances are not only not an addition to savings but occur in the midst of a sharp decline in the overall amount of accumulated savings. For example, the increases in cash holdings that are taking place today are in response to a major plunge in the real estate and stock markets, of numerous and sizable corporate bankruptcies, and of huge losses on the part of banks and other financial institutions.

All of this represents a reduction in asset values, i.e., in the value of accumulated savings. People are turning to cash in order to avoid further such losses of their accumulated savings. Of course, widespread attempts to convert assets other than cash into cash, entail further declines in the value of accumulated savings, since the unloading of those assets reduces their value.

Accumulated savings in the economic system have fallen by several trillion dollars, and nothing could be more incredible than that, in the midst of this, many people, including the great majority of professional economists, fear saving and think that it is necessary to stimulate consumption at the expense of saving. Such is the complete and utter lack of economic understanding that prevails.

One might expect that a group of people such as most of today’s economists, who pride themselves on their empiricism, would once and a while look at the actual facts of the world in which they live, and, in the midst of the loss of trillions of dollars of accumulated savings, begin to suspect that there might actually be a need to replace savings that have been lost rather than do everything possible to prevent their replacement.

Depressions and Credit Expansion

The loss of accumulated savings is at the core of the problem of economic depressions. Recessions and depressions and the losses that accompany them are the result of the attempt to create capital on a foundation of credit expansion rather than saving. Credit expansion is the lending out of new and additional money that is created out of thin air by the banking system, which acts with the encouragement and support of the government. The money so created and lent has the appearance of being new and additional capital, but it is not.

The fact of its appearing to be new and additional capital creates an exaggerated, false understanding of the amount of capital that is available to support economic activity. Like an individual who believes he has grown rich in the course of a financial bubble, and who is led to adopt a level of living that is beyond his actual means, business firms are led to undertake ventures that are beyond their actual means.

For an individual consumer, the purchase of an expensive home or automobile in the delusion that he is rich later on turns out to be a major loss in the light of the fact that he cannot actually afford these things and would have been better off had he not bought them. In the same way, business construction projects, stepped up store openings, acquisitions of other firms, and the like, carried out in the delusion of a sudden abundance of available capital, turn out to be sources of major losses when the delusion of additional capital evaporates.

Credit expansion also fosters an artificial reduction in the demand for money for cash holding, which sets the stage for a later rise in the demand for money for cash holding, such as was described a few paragraphs ago. The reduction in the demand for money for cash holding occurs because so long as credit expansion continues, it is possible for business firms to borrow easily and profitably and thus to come to believe that they can substitute their ability to borrow for the holding of actual cash. The rising sales revenues created by the expenditure of the new and additional money that is lent out also encourages the holding of additional inventories as a substitute for the holding of cash, in the conviction that the inventories can be liquidated easily and profitably.

Recessions and depressions are the result of the loss of capital in the malinvestments and overconsumption that credit expansion causes. The losses are then compounded by the rise in the demand for money for cash holding that subsequently follows. They can be further compounded by reductions in the quantity of money as well, such as would occur if the losses suffered by banks resulted in losses to the banks’ checking depositors. (Checking deposits are part of the money supply, indeed, the far greater part. In such cases, they would lose the status of money and assume that of a security in default, which would render them useless for making purchases or paying bills.)

The Housing Bubble

Our housing bubble is an excellent illustration of the malinvestment and overconsumption caused by credit expansion. Perhaps as much as $2 trillion or more of capital has been lost in the construction and financing of houses for people who, it turned out, could not afford to pay for them. The housing bubble was financed by the creation of $1.5 trillion of new and additional money in the form of checking deposits created for the benefit of home buyers.

The creation of these deposits rested on the readiness of the Federal Reserve System to create whatever new and additional supporting funds were required in the form of bank reserves. In the three years 2001-2004, the Federal Reserve created enough such funds to drive the interest rate paid on them, i.e., the Federal Funds Rate, below 2 percent. And from July of 2003 to June of 2004, it created enough such funds to hold this rate down to just 1 percent. The end result was a substantial reduction in mortgage interest rates and thus in monthly mortgage payments, which served greatly to increase the demand for houses.

Government also greatly contributed specifically to loans being made to homebuyers who were not credit worthy. It did this through its various loan-guarantee programs, carried out by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development; and by means even of outright extortion, though the Community Reinvestment Act, which required banks to make sufficient such loans as would satisfy local “community groups.”

In physical terms, the result of credit expansion was the passage of literally millions of houses that represented capital to the firms that built them, and to the banks and others that financed them, into the hands of consumers who not only had not contributed anything remotely comparable to the wealth and capital of the economic system but also had no realistic prospect of ever being able to do so. The further result has been that many of the builders of these houses are now ruined as are many of the banks and other investors that financed the construction and sale of those houses. And because so many lenders have lost so much, the business firms that depend on them for loans can no longer obtain those loans, and so they must close their doors and fire their workers.

The growing problem of unemployment that we are experiencing and the accompanying reduction in consumer spending on the part both of the unemployed and of those who fear becoming unemployed is the result of this loss of capital, not of any sudden, capricious refusal of consumers to spend or of banks to lend. Indeed, the kind of consumer spending that so many people want to revive and encourage, by means of “stimulus packages,” played a major role in the loss of capital that has taken place and now results in unemployment and impoverishment.

During the housing boom, millions of owners of existing houses thought that they were growing rich as the result of the rise in the prices of their homes and that they could actually live to a substantial degree off the accompanying increase in the equity in their homes. They borrowed against the increased equity and spent the proceeds. This consumption was at the expense of capital investment in the economic system, which was rendered correspondingly poorer by it. And when housing prices collapsed, and fell below the enlarged mortgage debts that had been taken on, the effect was to add to the losses suffered by lenders. This was the case to the extent such equity-consuming homeowners then walked away from their homes, leaving their creditors to lose by the decline in the price of their homes.

Keynesian Ignorance and Blindness

The immense majority of people, including, of course, most professional economists, are ignorant of the actual nature and cause of our financial crisis. This is because they are ignorant of the role of capital in the economic system. They are all Keynesians. (Even Milton Friedman, the alleged arch-defender of capitalism is reported to have said, “We are all Keynesians now.”)

But as von Mises so aptly put it, “The essence of Keynesianism is its complete failure to conceive the role that saving and capital accumulation play in the improvement of economic conditions.” (Planning for Freedom, 4th ed., p. 207. Italics in original.) In the eyes of Keynes and his countless followers, economic activity begins and ends with consumption.

So deeply do people hold the view that consumption is everything, that it blinds them to obvious facts. Thus, the present crisis has been well underway at least since the late spring of 2007, when the sudden collapse of two large Bear Stearns hedge funds occurred. This was followed by a continuing string of bankruptcies between June of 2007 and August of 2008 of significant-sized and fairly well-known firms, such as Aloha Airlines, Levitz Furniture, Wickes Furniture, Mervyns Department Stores, Linens N’ Things, IndyMac Bank, and Bear Stearns itself. The list includes an actual run on a major bank—Northern Rock in Great Britain—in September of 2007, probably the first such run since the 1930s.

Financial failures reached a crisis point in September of 2008, with the collapse of such major firms as American International Group (AIG), Lehman Brothers, and the Halifax Bank of Scotland. These were followed by the bankruptcy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant government-sponsored mortgage lenders that had led the way in guaranteeing sub-prime mortgages to borrowers who could not repay them.

Yet as late as September of 2008, the unemployment rate in the United States was no more than 6.2 percent and at mid-month the Dow Jones Industrial Average was still well above 11,000.

All this confirms that the crisis did not originate in any sudden refusal of consumers to consume or in any surge in unemployment. To the extent that unemployment is growing and consumption is declining, they are both the consequence of the economy’s loss of capital. The loss of capital is what precipitated a reduction in the availability of credit and a widening wave of bankruptcies, which in turn has resulted in growing unemployment and a decline in the ability and willingness of people to consume. The collapse in home prices and the more recent collapse in the stock market have also contributed to the decline in consumption, and probably to an even greater extent, at least up to now. Both of these events are also an aspect of the loss of capital and accumulated savings.

What Economic Recovery Requires

What all of the preceding discussion implies is that economic recovery requires that the economic system rebuild its stock of capital and that to be able to do so, it needs to engage in greater saving relative to consumption. This is what will help to restore the supply of credit and thus help put an end to financial failures based on a lack of credit.

Recovery also requires the freedom of wage rates and prices to fall, so that the presently reduced supply of capital and credit becomes capable of supporting a larger volume of employment and production, as I explained in “Falling Prices Are Not Deflation but the Antidote to Deflation,” which was my first article in this series. Recovery will be achieved by the combination of more saving, capital, and credit along with lower wage rates, costs, and prices.

In addition, recovery requires the rapid liquidation of unsound investments. If borrowers are unable to meet their contractual obligation to pay principal and interest, the assets involved need to be sold off and the proceeds turned over to the lenders as quickly as possible, in order to put an end to further losses and thus salvage as much capital from the debacle as possible.

In the present situation of widespread financial paralysis, firms and individuals can be driven into bankruptcy because they are unable to collect the sums due them from their debtors. Thus, for example, the failure of mortgage lenders would be alleviated, if not perhaps altogether avoided in some cases, if the mortgage borrowers who were in default on their properties lost their houses quickly, with the proceeds quickly being turned over to the lenders.

In that way, the lenders would at least have those funds available to meet their obligations and thus might avoid their own default; in either event, their creditors would be better off. In helping to restore the capital of lenders, or what will become the capital of the creditors of the lenders, quick foreclosures would serve to restore the ability to originate new loans.

Recovery requires the end of financial pretense. There are banks that do not want to see the liquidation of various types of assets that they own, notably, “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs). These are securities issued against collections of other securities, which in turn were issued against collections of mortgages, an undetermined number of which are in default or likely to go into default. The presumably low prices that such securities would bring in the market would likely serve to reveal the presence of so little capital on the part of many banks that they would be plunged into immediate bankruptcy. To avoid that, the banks want to prevent the discovery of the actual value of those securities. At the same time, they want creditors to trust them. Yet before trust can be established, the actual, market value of the banks’ assets must be established, even if it serves to bankrupt many of them. The safety of their deposits can be secured without the banks’ present owners continuing in that role.

When these various requirements have been met and the process of financial contraction comes to an end, the profitability of business investment will be restored and recovery will be at hand.

Next: Part II: Stimulus Packages


*Copyright © 2009, by George Reisman. George Reisman, Ph.D. is the author of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996) and is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Goldwater Institute. His web site is www.capitalism.net and his blog is www.georgereisman.com/blog/. A pdf replica of his book can be downloaded to the reader’s hard drive simply by clicking on the book’s title Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics and then saving the file when it appears on the screen. The book provides an in-depth, comprehensive treatment of the material discussed in this and subsequent articles in this series and of practically all related aspects of economics.